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Chapter 4 EMH and Abnormal Returns for
Chinese Acquisitions of Control
4.0 Introduction
When the term "efficient market" was introduced into the economics literature, it was
defined as a market which "adjusts rapidly to new information"181. Event studies,
pioneered by Fama et al (1969), generally found price adjustment following major
events such as earnings announcements, stock-splits, changes in firms' dividend
policies and mergers and acquisitions (M&As).
It soon became clear that although rapid adjustment to new information is an
important element of an efficient market, it is not the only one. A more modem
definition is that asset prices in an efficient market 'fully reflect all available
information"182. This implies that the market processes information rationally, in the
sense that relevant information is not ignored, and systematic errors are not made. As
a consequence, prices are always at levels consistent with "fundamentals."
Assume that share prices reflect the expected future profit and dividend streams
according to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), stock market data could be used
to estimate the effects of M&As. As documented in Chapter 3, M&A studies
generally reveal that mergers and acquisitions result in large positive wealth effects
for target shareholders. Research on the wealth effect for shareholders of the





EMH and effects of M&As are mainly conducted using data from well developed
financial markets, in particular, the US and UK. There has been limited empirical
evidence from emerging markets and they tend to be less comprehensive and less
conclusive. This is due to the transitional and dynamic nature of the emerging markets.
During China's transition to a market economy, its financial system, for instance, has
been undergoing a structural shift from a heavily-regulated and almost exclusively
bank-based system to one with much greater diversity of institutions including a
sophisticated stock market. Such a structural shift reflects the dynamic nature of its
stock market. In addition, the emerging markets seem to share some common
characteristics - a relatively shorter history, a stricter capital control policy, a less
well-developed legal framework, frequently modified regulations, and last but not
least, poorly educated investors - which contribute to the difficulties in studying
behaviours of the emerging markets.
However, there have been a growing number of empirical studies regarding emerging
markets in recent years. The main reasons for this are:
1. The emerging markets are playing an increasingly more important role in the
worldwide financial stage and investors worldwide desire to know more about
how they are operated and their performances;
2. Scholars wish to study these markets to gain a more complete understanding of
some of the fundamental theories in finance in a wider environment; and
3. More empirical research has become feasible and more results have been reported
simply because more data has become available.
China's stock market has expanded rapidly since the early 1990s. The speculation is
that China's securities market has the potential to rank among the top four or five in
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the world within the coming decade183. Yet relatively little is known about this young
player in the global community.
Previous empirical research concerning the Chinese market reports various results.
There is evidence of market efficiency, however, there is, on occasion, contradictory
evidence of departure from market efficiency.184
Whilst earlier empirical studies on China's stock market have mainly focused on the
correlation structure of different types of shares traded in the market, namely A shares
and B shares, more recent research has started to use event study methods to
investigate announcement effects, such as those of earnings and announcements of
acquisitions of control. This chapter attempts to extend the existing literature of
testing the EMH by examining Chinese listed firms' acquisitions of control
announcement effects between 1996 and 2000. Compared to previous research, this
study contributes to knowledge by using a more up-to-date data, a more clearly
defined event and the well-established event study approach.
The empirical results presented in this chapter does provide some evidence that the
domestic Chinese A share markets may be efficient in semi-strong form, yet it should
be noted that leakage of information or insider trading prior to the announcement
could contribute to the market reaction. The empirical results further found that the
shareholders of the targeted firms (i.e. the firms whose control is transferred) benefit
around, and in particular prior to the announcement in China. This finding is
183 Ma and Folkerts-Landau (2001)
184 For example, Bailey (1994), Ma (1996), Xu (2000), etc.
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consistent with the evidence from the West that value has been created by M&As, in
this case, to the targets' shareholders.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 re-addresses some of the
key terminologies regarding the Chinese stock markets. Section 4.2 recalls some
selected empirical literature and proposes a joint hypothesis. Data and methods are
described in the following section 4.3 and 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the results and 4.6
concludes this chapter.
4.1 Stock Market and M&As in China
This section briefly reviews the stock exchanges in China, the type of shares issued by
Chinese listed companies and M&As in China.185
4.1.1 Stock Markets
There are two official national exchanges in China - the Shanghai Stock Exchange
(SHSE) was established on December 19, 1990, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
(SZSE) was founded on July 3, 1991. The size of the two exchanges had expanded
rapidly. At the end of 2004, there were 837 and 536 firms listed on the SHSE and
SZSE, respectively. Table 4.1.1 below provides a summary of China's Stock
Exchanges.
Table 4.1.1 Brief Summary of China's Stock Exchanges
SHSE SZSE
Date of establishment 19th December, 1990 3rd April, 1991
Capitalisation (100 Million) 29,805 12,653
No. of companies listed 837 536
Note: (as at the end of 2004^
Source: SHSE and SZSE Fact Book 2004, published by China Financial Publisher
185 For a comprehensive description, please refer to Chapter 2.
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4.1.2 Share Types
Like many developing countries, China set up legal restrictions on the foreign
ownership of domestic equity in order to maintain control over local firms, especially
those companies that are of strategic and national importance. A major reason for this
arrangement is to attract foreign funds without worrying about the loss of ownership
control. Thus, a local firm in China may issue two different types of shares, namely,
A shares and B shares. Foreign investors are allowed to hold only the B shares but not
the A shares.186 The markets for the A shares and B shares are completely segmented
during the period of study, while the segmentation in most other markets are only
partial.
In addition to the segmentation caused by the A shares and B shares, a large
percentage of non-tradable "state-owned shares" further fragments the market. "State-
owned shares" include "state shares" and "legal-person shares". "State shares" are
shares obtained and made by a (public) institution on behalf of the state to a company
limited by shares. "Legal-person shares" are the shares obtained by a legal-person
entity in exchange for the capital contribution and made by that entity to a company
limited by shares using the state assets to which the entity had a legal right to dispose
of. The difference may be vague, however, it is not without its necessity given its
historical background as detailed in Chapter 2.
State-owned shares represent the dominant percentage in today's stock corporations'
shares and they are not traded in the secondary market. This is to comply with the
policies of maintaining a necessary dominant position for state shares and legal-
186 It was not until 2001 that domestic investors were allowed to trade in B share markets.
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person shares, whereas other shares are non-controlling and minority. As a result, the
trading of state shares is highly restricted while the trading of legal-person shares is
confined within the scope of legal-persons only.
4.1.3 M&As or Acquisitions of Control in China
In developed economies like those of the US and some European and Asian countries,
M&A transactions can assume numerous forms. In the US, for example, an
acquisition could take the form of a purchase of a target company's assets with either
cash or shares; a cash purchase of shares in the target; a purchase of shares in the
target with the purchaser's shares; or some combination of these forms. Mergers, like
acquisitions, can be effected with shares or cash. The transaction can leave the
purchaser in place, in the case of a forward merger; leave the target in place, in the
case of a reverse merger; or involve a subsidiary of the purchaser merging with the
target, in the case of a triangular merger.
M&A transactions in China, however, are in forms that are not entirely identical to the
ones described above due the unique share structure of listed companies and tighter
corporate restructuring control in China. They tend to appear in the form of the
transaction of state-owned shares between "legal-person"s. Since in any listed
company the majority of shares are state-owned shares, it is not difficult to see that
the trading/changing hand of these shares often brings changes in ownership/control,
which is the ultimate goal of any merger or takeover. This justifies the use of western
M&A research methodology to analyse the acquisitions of control in China.
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4.2 Literature and Hypothesis
This section briefly recalls some selected empirical evidence on the tests of EMH and
the target shareholders' gain around the announcement date.187 A joint hypothesis is
then proposed.
4.2.1 Tests ofEMH in China
Mookerjee and Yu (1999) found the existence of significant inefficiency including
weekend and holiday effects in China's two stock markets. This result is supported by
Ma (2000) who also found evidence of the day-of-the-week and the month-of-the-
year effects in the Chinese stock markets. Chen et al. (2001) found "Tuesdays
anomaly" existed during 1992-1997 in the Chinese stock markets. On the contrary,
Xu (2000) analysed the time series return and volatility patterns of the Shanghai
market but found no day-of-the-week effect in returns in the Shanghai stock market.
More recent studies such as Groenewold et al.'s (2003), Su's (2003) and Gao and Tse's
(2004) also report contradictory evidence. Overall, the studies of EMH in the Chinese
context have produced varied but not conclusive results.
4.2.2 Abnormal Returns and M&As
It is well established in the western literature that takeovers tend to provide substantial
economic benefits to shareholders of target firms. Numerous empirical studies have
187 For a detailed review, please refer to Chapter 3.
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found that acquired companies display statistically significant positive price responses
to the announcement of a takeover attempt.188
One of the recent studies that reports this result is Moeller et al. (2004). By examining
a sample of 12,023 acquisitions by public firms from 1980 to 2001, they find that the
equally weighted abnormal announcement return is 1.1% over a 2 day event window.
Zhang (2003) studied the Chinese M&As and also concludes that acquisitions creates
value for the target's shareholders.
In contrast, there is more doubt as to whether takeovers, on average, provide gains to
the shareholders of bidding firms. This, however, is of less concern for this study as
only one acquirer is listed. Whether the shareholders of acquiring firms gain or lose
from M&As in China could only be best tested in the future when there are more data
available.
4.2.3 A Joint Hypothesis
Assuming that there is semi-strong market efficiency, one can test for the effect of an
acquisition on expected future profit and dividend streams by measuring the change in
returns to acquiring company shareholders. But considering the unique characteristics
or the emerging stock markets, especially those of China, and the limited evidence
concerning the validity of the EMH in China, it is not logical to take this basic
assumption for granted in this study.
188 For a detailed review, please refer to Chapter 3.
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In order to correctly measure the effects of an acquisition in the Chinese context, it is
important to test the semi-strong market efficiency hypothesis at the same time. A
joint behavioural hypothesis is therefore proposed as follows.
The Chinese A share market fully reflects expected future profit and dividend
streams and the announcements of mergers or acquisitions in China create no
positive abnormal returns for targeted firms.
4.3 Data
The initial sample includes all 172 legal-person share transactions involving listed
companies between 1st January 1996 and 31st December 2000, inclusive. This section
provides a detailed prescription of the data collected.
4.3.1 Study Period
According to various statistics, seven listed firms were involved in restructurings prior
to 1996 (one in 1993, six in 1994 and none in 1995) l89, they appear to be "special"
cases190 or cases on an experimental base. This perhaps explains why the government
did not approve any legal-person share transaction in 1995. 1996 was therefore
chosen to be the starting point of the studied period. In 1997, there were further 10
transactions permitted. After a further two year trail, the annual numbers of
transactions increased sharply to 42 and 60 in the following two years, respectively.
189 Please refer to Table 2.4.3 in Chapter 2.
190 For instanee, the controversial "Bao-yan event" in 1993 is a hostile takeover via A share acquisition.
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The Chinese financial system has traditionally been dominated by the state banks.
When stock exchanges were established in the early 1990s, banks were allowed to set
up departments or subsidiaries as brokers and were dominant in share trading.
However as the Chinese stock markets expanded, the direct involvement of banks
became risky and was considered inappropriate. In 1994 banks were required to
withdraw their direct involvement in the stock market. Subsequently, the broker
departments became independent broker houses (Wan, 2002). Nonetheless, banks
continued to funnel large amounts of funds into the stock market and provided a
substantial part of liquidity. In 1996, regulations were further tightened by preventing
banks from offering loans for stock transactions. The aim of these regulations was to
encourage independent competitive securities firms to be the main sources of funds
such as mutual funds.
In 2000, however, the 1996 regulations were reversed and by the end of 2000 banks
resumed their positions as main sources of funds for stock investment (Wan, 2002). It
is likely that these changes in the regulations governing the relationship between the
banks and the stock market had effects on the efficiency with which the markets
processed information. This may explain the reduction of the number of legal-person
share transactions in 2000, down to 56. The end of 2000 was therefore chosen as the
end of the period for collecting data to try to minimise any unwanted potentially
distorting effects due to the changing roles of banks.
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4.3.2 The Event
Altogether, 172 transactions were initially identified as 172 listed companies selling
their legal-person shares to another party between 1st January 1996 and 31st December
2000, inclusive. Details include the date of each public announcement of the
transaction; the number of shares involved; the percentage of shares involved and
limited information regarding the acquirer.
The average percentage of legal-person shares (out of the total shares of a target) in
these transactions was 30.99%. The total value of state-owned shares traded was
RMB 16,580 million (over US$2,000 million).
4.3.3 Event date
The event dates, i.e. when such transaction was first publicly announced during the
time period studied, were collected from several sources, including individual
company reports provided by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Annual reports from the
Shanghai Exchange, Trading records and internal database from Guotai Securities
Ltd., Securities Daily (Shenzhen) and Shanghai Securities News.
4.3.4 Daily Price
The daily closing prices of these 172 companies' A shares, were then obtained from
the DataStream database. Three companies had to be excluded due to data
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unavailability in DataStream. This reduced the sample size to 169. Market composite
index is also obtained from the DataStream for two markets, respectively.
4.3.5 Company Reports
Information such as the ownership percentages of the targets and major accounting
ratios was primarily gathered from the individual company reports provided by the
SZSE and obtained from the internal database from Guotai Securities Ltd.
4.3.6 A Statistic Summary
The following table breaks down the sample into sub-groups by year, listed location,
and industry category.
Table 4.3.6 A Summary of Data
Year Category* # % # % sub-Total %
Shenzhen Market Shanghai Market Over all
A 0 0.00% 0 N/A 0 0.00%
B 0 0.00% 0 N/A 0 0.00%
1996 C 0 0.00% 0 N/A 0 0.00%
D 1 100.00% 0 N/A 1 100.00%
E 0 0.00% 0 N/A 0 0.00%
sub-Total 1 0 1
A 5 100.00% 3 60.00% 8 80.00%
B 0 0.00% 1 20.00% 1 10.00%
1997 C 0 0.00% 1 20.00% 1 10.00%
D 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
E 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
sub-Total 5 5 10
A 12 63.16% 13 56.52% 25 59.52%
B 2 10.53% 4 17.39% 6 14.29%
1998 C 3 15.79% 0 0.00% 3 7.14%
D 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
E 2 10.53% 6 26.09% 8 19.05%
sub-Total 19 23 42
* Listed companies are classified to different categories according to the nature of their business:
A-Industrial; B-Commcrcial; C-Rcal Estate; D-Public Affairs and E-misccllancous
152
Table 4.3.6 Summary of Data (Cont.)
Year Category* # % # % sub-Total %
Shenzhen Market Shanghai Market Over all
1999
A 18 54.55% 18 66.67% 36 60.00%
B 6 18.18% 2 7.41% 8 13.33%
C 1 3.03% 0 0.00% 1 1.67%
D 2 6.06% 2 7.41% 4 6.67%
E 6 18.18% 5 18.52% 11 18.33%
sub-Total 33 27 60
2000
A 23 67.65% 13 59.09% 36 64.29%
B 4 11.76% 6 27.27% 10 17.86%
C 3 8.82% 0 0.00% 3 5.36%
D 2 5.88% 0 0.00% 2 3.57%
E 2 5.88% 3 13.64% 5 8.93%





A 58 63.04% 47 61.04% 105 62.13%
B 12 13.04% 13 16.88% 25 14.79%
C 7 7.61% 1 1.30% 8 4.73%
D 5 5.43% 2 2.60% 7 4.14%
E 10 10.87% 14 18.18% 24 14.20%
Total 92 77 169
♦Listed companies arc classified to different categories according to the nature of their business:
A-Industrial; B-Commercial; C-Rcal Estate; D-Public Affairs and E-misccllancous
A further 9 transactions had to be excluded from the final sample because they were
listed for less than 250 days until the transaction, whereby the whole estimation
period (see section 4.4) could not be considered, reducing the final number of event
covered in this study to 160.
4.4 Step-by-Step Methodology
In this section, a step-by-step description is presented of how the single factor Market
Model, Mean-adjusted Return Model and Market-adjusted Return Model were used to
estimate the abnormal returns in the event studies. The description follows traditional
event study methodology and the significance test.
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4.4.1 Estimation
The market model assumes that at any given time the return on a portfolio can be
described by a linear function of the return on a market portfolio and a stochastic error.
Mathematically, the market model is described by:
Rit = a i + /?, Rmt + eit (4.1)
where
Rit = stock return of company i at time t;
Rmt = stock return ofmarket portfolio m at time t;
at, /3: = parameters of the relationship between stock returns of company i and the
market portfolio;
£u = estimation error, a stochastic term assumed to be distributed normally with
mean equal to zero, constant variance for each company and zero correlation over
observations and time;
and
t = day measured relative to the event, where t = 0 is the day of the
announcement; t = -1, the day immediately preceding the announcement; and t = +1,
the trading day immediately following the announcement, etc.
The parameters and /3i are estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
method over the estimated period - the estimation period in my study is from trading
day-250 to trading day-61. The event study method assumes that the parameters are
constant over the estimation and event periods, and the predicted returns are assumed
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to be unbiased estimates of the actual returns unless firm-specific information
significantly influences the returns.
An important decision in event studies is the choice of the event day, trading day 0.
The event day in the studies has been determined from the first publication of the
event, with the event day equalling the publication day if it is a trading day, and
otherwise being the first trading day after the publication day.
4.4.2 Abnormal Returns for Event Period
The observed abnormal return (ARU ) for company i on day t is then calculated as
the difference between the actual returns of the studied companies (Rit) and the
A A
predicted returns (a, + (3i Rmt), calculated from the market portfolio using estimates of
the parameters at and /?, in equation (4.1):
Market Model: ARit = Rit - ai - /? Rmt (4.2)
For the Mean-adjusted Return Model, the predicted return in the absence of any
information effects is assumed to be the mean return of the share over the estimation
period:
Mean-adjusted Return Model: ARU = Rit - Rt (4.3)
For the Market-adjusted Return Model, the predicted return is assumed to be the
market return over the estimation period:
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Market-adjusted Return Model: ARit = Rit - Rmt (4.4)
where
Ri is the average return of the share during the estimation period.
The cumulative abnormal return of company i over the event period is then estimated
where
M = number of days in the event period;
ARit is determined by equation 4.2, 4.3, or 4.4.





N = number of shares.
Thus all shares for the same event period t form an equally weighted portfolio and
are treated as a single observation. Then the cumulative average abnormal return









M = number of time periods under consideration.
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The values of AARt and CAAR calculated from the three models are presented in
Table 4.5a. (see Section 4.5)
4.4.3 Significance Test
All three models require data from the estimation period to allow statistical
significance tests. The term "estimation error" will be used when referring to the
estimation period and "abnormal return" to the event period.
Estimation errors for all shares during the estimation period were calculated as below:
Market Model: eit - Rit - {at+ /? Rml ) (4.8)
Mean-adjusted Return Model: eit = Rlt - Rt (4.9)
Market-adjusted Return Model: eit = Rit - Rml (4.10)
The average estimation errors et over all N shares in day t during the estimation
period is calculated as follows:
(4.11)
The average estimation error over all N shares for the entire estimation period,




T = number of observation days in the estimation period.
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£ effectively provides us with a benchmark of the estimation error over all N shares
for all time periods in the estimation period. That is to say, if no corporate
restructuring is forthcoming to cause share price, and hence stock returns, to increase
or decrease materially from the normal level, £ forms one's estimate of the error that
is expected.
Subsequently, the standard deviation of the estimation errors across all shares in day t
during the estimation period is determined as follows:-
Finally, to test the null hypothesis that the abnormal return in day t in the event period,
the t statistic is used and defined as the abnormal return for that period (AAR,, given
by Equation 4.6) divided by the standard deviation determined in Equation 4.13:-
If the average abnormal return over all shares at time t, given by AARt , are
independent from one time period to the next, identically distributed, and normal, then
the t-value is distributed as Student's t. The degrees of freedom are then T-l. It is
worthwhile noticing though, that since the average abnormal return is used, the test
statistic takes into account cross-sectional dependence in the abnormal returns.
In order to test the presence of significant abnormal returns over multiple












where S(et) is the value calculated in Equation 4.13, L is the last day of the event
window and n is the number of days over which the cumulative abnormal return is
calculated (L - j).
Table 4.5b shows the t stat values for the studied portfolio over different time
intervals during the event period: day-60 to day+60 (n=121); day-20 to day+20
(n=41); day-10 to day+10 (n=21); day-5 to day+5 (n=ll); and finally day-1 to day 0
(n=2).
The following Section 4.5 presents the empirical results.
4.5 Results and Analysis
As outlined in section 4.2.3, the aim of this chapter is to test the joint hypothesis:
The Chinese A share market fully reflects expected future profit and dividend
streams and the announcements of mergers or acquisitions in China create no
positive abnormal returns for targeted firms.
The joint hypothesis essentially breaks into two parts:
1) the market is efficient - the stock prices adjust quickly to any new
information; and
2) the transactions create value for the target firms' shareholders.
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4.5.1 Testing the EMH
The data shows that share prices underwent (significant) changes on the first
announcement of the merger or acquisition. The aim of this section is to provide a
formal statistical test of the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns.
Table 4.5a lists all the average abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample of 160
companies from day-60 to+60 (121 days in total) and the cumulative abnormal returns
(CAARs). T-statistic values of daily AAR are listed along side. The results were
computed from three models, namely the Market Model, the Mean Adjusted Return
Model and the Market Adjusted Return Model.
All the models produce similar results, leading to the same conclusion. All three
models identify significant abnormal returns at the 0.01 level as early as trading day-
54. This seems to indicate that the market anticipated the forthcoming changes i.e.
M&A activities and started to react accordingly. If this is true, then it means there
might be some information leakage (for example when two companies started
negotiation and started seeking permission from their superior governmental
departments) as early as more than two months prior to the event day 0. We have to
be cautious in this interpretation for three reasons:
1) as indicated in Chapter 2, there appears to be no regularity in terms of when
the buyers and sellers initialise the negotiation.
2) a relatively long event window of 121 days (day-60 to day+60) is likely to
include the effects of noise - news other than M&A activities which affects
firms' value and this early abnormal return might have nothing to do with our
concern: M&A activity.
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3) this early one-day abnormal return (day-54) is not continued. It is possible that
the reason for this early adjustment lies in the data sample itself: it could
simply be the effect of certain outliers in the data sample. Given the general
volatility in the Chinese stock markets as shown in Chapter 2, a few outliers
are expected.
A robustness check has subsequently been carried out regarding the above point 3).
The data sample has been screened for outliers, i.e. sharp adjustment in stock prices
and daily returns. I will use day -54's figure to illustrate the screening.
First, the mean and standard deviation for all firms' daily returns on day-54 are
calculated, hence there are 160 observations. The table below provides descriptive
statistics for all firms' returns on day-54. If a particular firm's return on day-54 is 3
standard deviations away from the mean, i.e., it is outside of the mean+3 x standard
deviation range, then we consider the possibility that it could be an outlier (a
conventional definition).
Table 4.5.1b Descriptive Statistics of Daily Returns ofAll 160 Firms on Day-54
















After the initial round of screening, there appears to be two companies' daily returns
that are "distant" from the rest of their peers: 12.07% for company A and -10.05% for
company B. Another round of data screening is then carried out. First, company A's
all daily returns throughout day-250 to day+250 are examined to see if 12.07% is also
an "extreme" return at company level - There might be a chance that this particular
company just happens to constantly deliver higher daily returns. Mean and standard
deviations are calculated for all 501 observations (day-250 to day +250) and it is
found that this 12.07% return is outside of the mean± 3 x standard deviation range as
well. Exact procedures have been followed regarding company B's daily returns and it
is confirmed that -10.05% is also an outlier at company level. Before further actions
are to be considered, however, it is important to understand the nature of these
"outliers" and their possible impacts on the empirical analysis for there are reasons
why these two values should not be treated as outliers.
Chinese stock markets are volatile and share prices are known to be moving up and
down more sharply compared to developed markets. 191 Two returns in this case,
12.07% and -10.05%, may be "extreme" but perhaps they truly reflect the reality of
the Chinese stock market. More importantly, on this specific day -54, two extreme
returns seem to be offsetting each other and when they are averaged across 160 firms,
the impact these two values have on empirical results should be small. It is true that
outliers by definition are observations "numerically" distant from the rest of the data,
but one should be cautious in identifying the outliers in this case, especially
considering the unique data set we might be dealing with.
191 See section 2.3.1.
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Similar screenings have been carried out for day-51, -49, -48, -38, -36, -32, -13, -12
and -9 respectively, and there are altogether 21 observations being numerically and
marginally distant from the rest of the data.
Outliers' potential impacts on empirical modelling and interpretation should be noted.
An extreme outlier in the estimation period will increase the estimation errors in the
model and the standard deviation will be larger than it should have been. T-values
thus can become too small. As a result, one might tend not to reject the null
hypothesis when one should have. Similarly, significant outliers in the event window
can cause wrong conclusions to be drawn.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that if an outlier is identified, the conventional ways
to treat it are either to exclude it from the sample or to replace it with a proxy, in this
case, the boundary of the identification range: mean + 3 x standard deviation or mean
- 3 x standard deviation. However, due to the argument and considerations presented
no action is taken to omit or trim these observations.
Figure 4.5.1a, 4.5.1b and 4.5.1c provide a graphic representation of the average
abnormal returns of all firms from the three models over a 121-day period centred on
the event date. Figure 4.5.Id is a graphic representation of the cumulative average
abnormal returns for the same period from the three models.
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Figure 4.5.1b Mean Adjusted Model AAR for All Firms Over Day-60 to Day+60































































All three models identify significant positive average abnormal returns in the
immediate days before the event date, day-4, -3 and -1, at 0.05 level. It appears that
the market was adjusting quickly to the forthcoming event, although there may be
short-term information leakage, which is well documented. Many studies have shown
that a large proportion of abnormal stock market reaction is detected prior to the
actual announcement owing to tradings by insiders, for instance, around the
announcements of dividends (Aharony and Swary 1980), around the announcements
of takeovers (Eyssell and Arshadi 1993, etc.) or around earnings announcements (Su,
2003).
It is noteworthy, however, that the positive abnormal returns continued into the event
day 0 and day 1: 0.59% and 0.41%, respectively, as identified by the Market Model,
significant at 0.05 level. While these positive abnormal returns are statistically
significant, their economic significance may be limited. There are a few possible
explanations towards these abnormal returns. One of them is that it indicates that the
market continues to adjust upon learning the announcement. A much simpler reason
could be that if an announcement was made after the market closes on any particular
day, the market would not be able to react till the following day - however our data
does not allow us to further pinpoint the announcement time in the announcement day.
In clear contrast, there is no significant (at 0.05 level) abnormal returns being
identified in the immediate post-announcement period, from day 2 till day 39. This
could be interpreted that once news reaches the general public, announcements of
acquisitions of control convey no new information. This may provide supporting
evidence that the Chinese stock markets are semi-strong efficient. However, as fully
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noted throughout the thesis, one should be cautious interpreting these results given a
young and immature market.
In summary, the empirical results indicate that the Chinese A share market seems able
to correctly anticipate new information relating to the announcements regarding
transfers of control before they are announced to the public. There may be signs of
information leakage which could ultimately be used to make small positive abnormal
returns around event day.
4.5.2. Value Creation
Table 4.5.2a below presents a list of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs)
based on seven different event windows. Day-60 to day+60; day-20 to day+20, day-
10 to day+10, day-5 to day+5, day-1 to day+1 and day-1 to day 0. T-statistic values
are also included for the relevant figures. CAARs calculated from all three models are
presented.
As Table 4.5.2a shows, significant positive CAARs are identified for all event
windows. For example, using the Market Model, Cumulative Average Abnormal
Returns were 6.99%, 5.95%, 3.10%, 2.80%, 1.66%, 1.25% and 0.59% for different
event windows, respectively. The results suggest that the market anticipates these
corporate restructuring activities as "value-adding" and M&As bring benefits to the
shareholders of targeted firms. Although the potential information leakage and insider
trading may well be part of the nature of the market.
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There are, however, three issues that need to be clarified before any formal conclusion
can be drawn.
1. Outliers: As explained earlier, since all 160 samples were examined as a whole
group, it is possible that certain outliers may cause undesired effect and make the
results biased.
2. Changes in market risk: The market risk for a company may shift during the
periods when it is undergoing fundamental changes such as M&A activities. Since the
event study used in this chapter estimates beta from day-250 to day-61 and assumes
that the beta remains unchanged during the event period, the CAARs generated might
not be the correct proxy of companies' market risks. It is perhaps helpful to investigate
the variations in the companies' market risks in a pre- and post- event period.
3. Pre and Post-event returns: The results in Table 4.5.2a are generated from event
windows centred on day 0 and it is evident that M&As are "value-adding" in Chinese
A shares markets - the shareholders of the targeted firms gain from such activities.
However, Table 4.5.2a does not examine the pre-announcement returns separately
from the post-announcement returns. Such a comparison would give more insights
into the value creation for shareholders of the targeted firms, and perhaps would also
help to explain if the announcements convey new information to the market once they
are released to the public.
Table 4.5.2b extends the above points 2) and 3) and presents a comparison of pre- and
post-event CAARs and their t values.
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As shown from Table 4.5.2b, there is a clear difference between pre-event and post-
event CAARs. All three models identify significant positive abnormal returns in pre-
event windows: day-60 to day-1, day-20 to day-1, day-10 to day-1 and day-5 to day-1.
Both the Market Model and the Mean adjusted Return Model identify negative
CAARs in the event window immediately after the announcement, although the
majority of these negative CAARs are not statistically significant (only one significant
-3.53% for day+1 to day+60). These results show that the shareholders of the target
firms gain prior to the M&As' announcements. As soon as the news was released to
the public, M&A activities announcements convey no new information.
If the market is at least semi-efficient, and assuming that the data is not biased and the
estimated companies' beta is an appropriate proxy of companies' market risk during
the period of concern, then positive abnormal returns are generated by acquisitions of
control. Shareholders of "targeted" firms benefit from such activities. The behavioural
hypothesis that the announcement creates no positive abnormal return is therefore
supported. Information leakage prior to the announcement has already been reflected
in a positive abnormal return. The information discerned by investors that an
acquisition of control is likely to take place has resulted in positive abnormal returns.
4.6 Conclusion
There are many theories in the literature as to why companies attempt M&As or
acquisitions of control. One is the "value maximisation theory", which states that
management attempts to maximise shareholder wealth. In line with this reasoning,
acquisitions performed by a company are viewed as being made with the purpose of
increasing the company's stock value. This value creation may come from productive
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as well as non-productive sources. Another reason why firms attempt acquisition of
control is the "growth maximisation theory", which states that after fulfilling a certain
profitability level, a company's managers will strive to further their own ends rather
than working to benefit shareholder wealth.
Numerous studies have documented that M&A activities creates value for the
shareholders of target firms. This chapter extends this line of research into the
Chinese context.
Using a sample of 160 legal-person share transactions involving listed companies
between 1996 and 2000, and their announcement dates, hence a unique event, a joint
hypothesis was tested in this chapter. The empirical results indicate that the Chinese A
share market seems able to correctly anticipate new information relating to the
announcements before they are announced to the public. There may be however signs
of information leakage which could ultimately be used to make small positive
abnormal returns around event day.
Further empirical tests were carried out to examine whether acquisitions of control
(via legal-person share transactions, a major forms of M&As in China) create value
for the target firms' A share shareholders. It is further concluded that the shareholders
of the targeted firms benefit from such activities in China.
There are two parts in the joint hypothesis: the test of the EMH and that the
announcement does not give target shareholders gains from M&As or acquisition of
control.
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The first part of the hypothesis is not rejected, as the market's reaction does not seem
to be inconsistent with market efficiency. However, leakages of information and/or
insider trading prior to the announcement could well cause such reaction. Therefore, I
can not conclude definitely that the Chinese A share stock market is semi-strong
efficient. This study does suggest however that Chinese A share markets are
somewhat informationally efficient for there are no abnormal returns identified post-
event. This indicates that the market was able to adjust fairly quickly upon learning
the information contained in the announcement and once the announcement is made
public, it conveys no new information. Therefore, the changes in share prices reflect
changes in the expected future profit and dividend streams - new information
contained within the announcement.
The second part of the hypothesis is supported as the evidence from this chapter
shows that positive abnormal returns are indeed created for target firms prior to the
announcement. However, the information revealed does not result in abnormal returns
being created for target firms' shareholders.
Empirical event study methodology was used in this chapter to test a basic but
fundamental joint hypothesis. As clearly stated in previous sections, the results were
not without their limitations. Apart from those mentioned, there are additional and
perhaps more important issues that remain un-answered and need to be further tested,
such as the motivations, size effects, geographic correlations, ownership/privatisation
(or partial privatisation) issues, etc. These detailed studies would help to gain a clearer
understanding of Chinese stock market. That, would be the goal of next Chapter.
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Chapter 5 Further Analysis of Abnormal
Returns
5.0 Introduction
In Chapter 4 a joint hypothesis concerning the EMH and the effects of merger
announcements on abnormal returns was examined using a sample of 160 listed
companies' legal-person share transactions between 1996 and 2000. It was found that
overall the shareholders of the targeted firms benefit from such acquisitions of
corporate control in China. The findings are consistent with the previous M&A
literature in the West, which generally conclude that target firm shareholders enjoy
significantly positive returns around the announcements in almost all cases (Jensen
and Ruback (1983), Datta et al. (1992) and Bruner (2002)).
Being a relatively young player in the global capital market, Chinese securities
markets share some common characteristics with other emerging markets as outlined
before - a relatively shorter history, stricter capital control policy, less well-developed
legal framework, frequently modified regulations, and last but not least, inexperienced
investors. In addition Chinese stock markets are unique for being the only stock
markets in a socialist state: The markets are dominated by SOEs which have
complicated mixed share structures. Only approximately 30 per cent of listed
companies' total shares are traded on the markets. Legal-person shares can only be
traded among "legal-person"s, etc. It is perhaps because of this immature nature and
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special characteristics, that empirical results obtained using data from such
transitional markets need to be interpreted carefully.
Whilst not many empirical studies have been conducted regarding M&As or
acquisitions of control in China, the findings presented in Chapter 4 are consistent
with those of the previous Chinese research (Zhang 2003; Shi 2002, Tan 1998).
However, as noted in Chapter 3, these studies have their limitations, both
methodological and analytical. Compared to previous research, this study uses more
up-to-date data and a more clearly defined event. In addition, Chapter 5 will further
contribute to the literature by looking into different explanatory factors, which may
have different impacts on the impacts ofM&As or acquisitions of control. The targets
in the data sample are divided into sub-groups according to different characteristics
they bear and comparisons are made in order to gain a better understanding of the
M&As in China. These in-depth comparisons, give a clearer picture of the
motivations and effects ofM&As in China than has previously been possible.
While empirical researches conducted in more mature markets were normally
supported by well-developed financial theories and economic models which
originated from these Western markets and economies, research regarding Chinese
financial markets has tended not to be backed by established theories developed
specifically in the Chinese socialism context. In this research the explanatory
variables are selected based on both research findings from the West and the
theoretical arguments concerning the unique characteristics of the Chinese securities
markets. Seven explanatory variables are identified and they are "location," "industry
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effect," "time line," "firm sizes," "A Share proportion," "voting power" and "previous
performance."
Detailed analysis of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) associated with
different variables reveals that some variables such as "previous performance" and
"voting power" appear to be of more explanatory power than variables such as "firm
sizes," "A Share proportion," etc. It is found that not all targets shareholders gain from
acquisitions of control in China. The market anticipates certain acquisitions to be
more "value-adding" than others.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section reviews seven
explanatory variables. Section 5.2 describes the data and proposes the statistical
hypotheses. Section 5.3 presents the empirical results and their interpretations and
section 5.4 summarises the chapter.
5.1 Explanatory Variables
This section describes the explanatory variables that may have impacts on the stock
returns around the announcements of acquisitions of control in China. Seven
explanatory variables are identified: "location," "industry effect," "time line," "firm
sizes," "A Share proportion," "voting power" and "previous performance."
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5.1.1 Location
The first explanatory variable is the location where the target firms are listed, namely,
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) - a
company can choose to list on either one of the two exchanges but not on both. It is
not uncommon for a country to have more than one stock exchange. However,
contrary to the global trend of merging multi exchanges of a single jurisdiction into a
single-exchange structure, China currently has two stock markets that are performing
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virtually the same functions in every aspect .
While most companies listed on the SHSE tend to be larger and more manufactory-
oriented, those on the SZSE are smaller and more export-oriented. Two markets
therefore might attract different types of investors in terms of the levels of risk they
are willing to take. This leads to the assertion that the announcement of a merger or
acquisition may be perceived differently by the two markets, hence, different share
price movement.
However, given the immature nature of the Chinese securities markets and the less
experienced (and perhaps less rational) individual domestic investors, the above
assertion may well not be true. If the two stock exchanges are designed to, and are,
serving the same function, then it would be logical to expect a matching pattern in
terms of share price adjustment in different markets. Abnormal returns, if they exist,
should be no different between the two markets.
125
They differ slightly in a few technical operational trivia.
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5.1.2 Industry Effect
During the study period, listed companies were classified into six categories
according the natures of their primary businesses, namely Industrial, Commercial,
Real Estate, Utilities, Financial and Miscellaneous.
Ever since China shifted its attention from the agricultural reform in rural areas to the
industrial reform in urban areas from the mid-80s, stated owned industrial enterprise
modernisation has always been near the top of the government's agenda. Given the
fact that the state owned section suffered most in terms of deficit, priority has been
given to them to list on the stock markets, so that they could raise much needed
capital for their reform. It is therefore not surprising to see that the majority of listed
firms are under Industrial category. For example, there were 484 firms listed on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange by the middle of 2000, 289 of which were classified as
Industrial - a dominant 59.71%. This dominance has also been reflected in the sample
studied: 97 out 160 (60.63%) targets were Industrial.
It has been reported that there is some degree of performance difference between
industries (Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988); Rumelt (1991)). Such performance
difference may well have an impact on the share returns during corporate
restructuring activities. Therefore, it is desirable for this chapter to differentiate the
sample into Industrial and non-Industrial groups so that the performance difference




The Interim Provisions on the Management of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks
(Interim Provisions) issued by the State Council on 22 April 1993 for a long time
served as a nationwide securities regulation. With merely nine chapters and 84 articles,
the Interim Provisions were not complex and far from being complete. Chapter 4 of
the Interim Provisions does not allow any domestic "natural-person" to hold more
than 0.5% of the shares in a listed company. It further states that a listed company can
only be taken over by bid126 and the threshold is 30%.127 It however did not specify
how state shares or legal-person shares should be traded and what procedures should
be followed. In terms of information disclosure, Article 60 implies that, under certain
circumstances, a listed company may be exempted from disclosing a major corporate
event promptly if approved by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
and the stock exchanges.
The Corporate Law, promulgated by the National People's Congress on 29 December
1993 and effective from 1 July 1994, was the first national law governing corporate
enterprises. Althogh it included some provisions on share transfer and mergers, it did
not cover state-owned shares transactions in detail either. Article 147 allows legal-
person shares to be assigned after a period of three years commencing from the date
of the company's establishment, but Article 148 further states that the approval and
regulatory measures for such assignment or purchase shall be "separately prescribed
1 98
by the relevant national statutes or administrative regulations." However, these
126 Taking over by agreement was further permitted by the Securities Law, 1999.
127 Given the conditions of Chinese securities markets, taking over a listed company by purchasing its
circulating A shares over the secondary market is both time-consuming and expensive. For a more
detailed description, please refer to Chapter 2.
128 Section 2, Chapter 4, The Corporate Law.
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"relevant" statutes or regulations were not specified, hence they referred to the vast
amount of regulations/interim provisions/provisional measurements issued by various
governing entities. These entities range from the state council, the People's Bank of
China (PBC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to local governmental departments.
The Interim Provisions and the Corporate Law mentioned above, along with other
provisional regulations129 form the initial legal framework governing the Chinese
securities market. However, their regulatory power was limited due to the lack of a
national securities law.
The promulgation of the Securities Law was therefore seen as a milestone in the
development of securities market in China. The Securities Law was passed by the
People's Congress on 29 December, 1998 and went into effect on 1 July, 1999.
Compared to the Interim Provisions and the Corporate Law, which were drafted and
issued in a relatively short time period and subsequently criticised for being not
comprehensive and considerate, it took over 5 years before the final draft of Securities
Law was submitted for approval. Many legal improvements were indeed brought in
by it, as discussed in Chapter 2.
Although it failed yet again to address state-owned share trading issues properly, the
Securities Law defines plans of merger or acquisition as "inside information" and
requires such information, as well as any information regarding major corporate
restructuring activities, to be disclosed to the general public through pointed channels
129 Over 100 national/local regulations (Ma 2003) were issued between 1993 and 1998, all having
certain direct jurisdiction power over the Chinese securities markets.
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promptly.130 This regulatory change is of particular interest for this research. Because
Article 60 from The Interim Provisions essentially indicates that markets may not
necessarily be aware of M&A activities as the concerned targets may be exempted
from disclosing such information promptly, this regulatory change ensures that such
news will have to be disclosed, and disclosed promptly. The Securities Law will have
an impact on the sample studied in this research.
The date, 1 July 1999, when the Securities Law became effective is therefore chosen
as a criterion to divide the sample into two sub-groups. The pre-1 July 1999
acquisitions of control announcement effects are examined against those post-1 July
1999 results to help gain an understanding of the impacts that the Securities Law
brought into the Chinese stock markets.
5.1.4 Firm Size
The positive effect of target size on the stock returns of the acquiring firm is well
documented and supported by the findings of many previous studies (Moeller,
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004)). If the target firms are a material proportion of the
worth of the acquirer, such acquisitions of control tend to result in greater wealth
gains. It implies that the announcement of an acquisition for a smaller target may
convey different information to capital market participants compared with acquisition
announcements for larger targets. Anderson, Haynes and Heaney (1994) find that
small targets appear to earn greater abnormal returns around the time of
announcement of a takeover offer than large firms.
130 Article 69, Chapter III, the Securities Law.
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Whether acquisitions of smaller targets create more value in China may be tested
using the available data set. However, certain assumptions need to be made before
proceeding.
"The relative size of acquisition" used in the previous studies is normally defined as a
ratio of transaction value divided by the market value of the acquiring firm. Since the
market values of the Chinese acquiring firms cannot be obtained, given the fact that
virtually all acquirers are non-listed companies, a conventional relative ratio cannot be
obtained, hence, a proxy needs to be used instead.
Two proxies were initially considered: 1) the value of a transaction, measured by the
number of legal-person shares involved times the price agreed per share131; and 2) the
value of a target, measured by the book value of the total assets of a target firm. Due
i -jo
to the lack of documentation on how the acquiring prices were agreed on , the
values of such transactions may be a poor estimate of the target size. The second
proxy was therefore chosen as the fourth variable. Limitations of using this proxy,
however, should be noted. Whereas the Western research conventionally use
"relative" size, i.e. target size compared to acquirer size, the proxy used in this
research is an "absolute" size, i.e. the absolute size of the target in terms of the total
assets' value. This may indeed lead to unexpected results.
131 Note that it is not the market price of targets' tradable shares.
132
Although in practice, net value of assets was used as an indicator, the pricing of state-owned shares
remained a maze.
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The data sample was divided into two sub-groups using the median of the absolute
sizes of the target firms, measured by the book value of the total assets which was
provided in the annual reports preceding the event dates.
5.1.5 A Share Proportion
The fifth explanatory variable is the percentage of A shares which are measured by
the ratio of the number of A shares divided by the total number of shares outstanding
of the target firm prior to the announcement. This variable has two possible
implications.
First, it is an indicator of the number of retail individual shareholders of a target, due
to severe regulations during the period studied, a retail individual A share investor
seldom holds more than 0.5 percent of any listed company's A shares. Since the
. i -io
majority of the investors in the Chinese A share markets are retail investors , the
percentage of tradable A shares of a listed company can be seen as a proxy for the
number of small shareholders. That is, if a firm has a higher percentage ofA shares, it
is generally safe to estimate that this firm has more small individual retail
shareholders in its shareholder structure than a firm with a lower percentage of A
shares.
Given the fact that the retail investors in China are relatively inexperienced compared
to their Western counterparts, it is expected that individual Chinese investors may buy
133 By the end of 1999, for instance, the number ofA shares account for an average of 30% of all shares.
An estimated 25% were held by retail investors; 5% by institutional investors, (source: China Securities
Outlook. Sept. 2000) Also please refer to Table 2.2.2.
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or sell in an irrational manner especially when the arrival of new information does not
reach them promptly and/or when the information is not interpreted correctly. In
addition, information disclosure procedures were not regulated clearly during the
studied period, resulting in the possibility that public information may not be
completely "public" after all.
Second, the A share proportion indicates the level of privatisation of SOE in China,
which is ofmore importance to this chapter. Privatisation shifts ownership and control
of public assets to private investors. However, it is not clear how changes in state
ownership affect firm performance. Some economists argue that, in competitive
markets, state ownership is perhaps inferior to private ownership (Dewenter and
Malatesta (2001)). Some empirical researches have supported that government
ownership is less efficient than private ownership. The authors also report that the
evidence on profitability improvement subsequent to privatisation is mixed. In
contrast, studies such as Kole and Mulherin's (1997) suggest that government
ownership is not necessarily less efficient than private ownership.
Like many governments, the Chinese government uses privatisation as an important
means to strengthen SOEs in China. Due to the experimental nature of the reform, the
Chinese government has been very careful and has proceeded cautiously in the
privatisation process. In fact, the official term used in China is not "privatisation" but
"share ownership scheme". Additionally it should be noticed that there is not even a
single SOE which has been completely privatised so far.
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Sun et al. (2003), using regression analysis, suggested that partial government
ownership has a positive impact on SOE performance in China. Further investigation
by the authors showed that "the relationship between government ownership andfirm
performance follows an inverted U-shape pattern. A certain level of government
ownership seems 'optimal'."134
The A share percentage of a listed company is a very good indicator of the level of
privatization of a Chinese SOE. A higher percentage of A Shares would mean a
higher degree of partial privatisation and vice versa. It would be desirable to see what
the impacts are of different degrees of partial privatisation on anticipated firm
performance, during event periods such as those around the announcement of an
acquisition of control.
5.1.6 Voting Power
A shareholder's ability to affect a company's activities, his voting power, is normally
proportional to his degree of ownership. Legal-person shareholders in China,
however, effectively enjoy a higher percentage in voting power with a relatively lower
but controlling percentage of equities. This is due to the unique share structure of
Chinese listed companies, and the fact that virtually no individual A-share shareholder
takes part in companies' management.135
134 Sun et al. (2003)
135 Because of 1) any individual investor were not allowed to hold more than 0.5% of a listed
company's shares - set by the Interim Provisions although later dropped by the Securities Law, and 2)
the short-term speculating behaviour in the Chinese A share markets. Also please refer to Chapter 2.
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Major shareholders are more likely to be appointed to the board of directors and have
influence over management selection as well as to have access to inside information.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) asserted that the controlling shareholder might "make"
the management run the company in the best interest of the controlling shareholder
even if it would harm the minority.
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) looked at the managerial ownership of companies
with dual classes of stock. In their sample of 45 firms, the insiders owned almost 57
percent of the stock conferring voting power, but only 24 percent of the equity. They
also studied 4 cases where the class of share with the highest voting power received
"substantial acquisition premiums". Megginson's (1990) study based on UK data
revealed similar results: in 37 out of 43 bids for companies with dual classes of
common stock, the share with the highest voting power received the highest premium.
Stulz, Walking and Song (1990) studied the target ownership structure in successful
tender offers and found that it played an important part in the total takeover gain - the
target shareholders' gain increased with institutional ownership. Whereas the western
literature has covered voting power issues well, there has been little research
addressing this issue in the Chinese context.
In order to examine the effects of voting power in the Chinese context, the sixth
variable is defined as the percentage of the involved legal-person shares in the target's
total shares. The data sample is then divided into two sub-groups where a higher
percentage of legal-person shares involved would be a proxy for higher voting power.
191
5.1.7 Previous Performance
The last explanatory variable considered in this chapter is the previous performance of
a target firm.
One of the prominent motives for takeovers, which has been generally accepted by
financial economists, is of a disciplinary nature i.e. to punish those poorly managed -
also known as the inefficient management hypothesis. Brealey and Myers (1991) note
that "If this motive is important, one would expect that firms that perform poorly tend
to be targets for acquisition,"136 Indeed, many empirical tests of this hypothesis
attempt to predict the probability of takeover by examining either stock returns prior
to acquisition (Franks and Mayer (1996), Agrawal and Jaffe (2003)) or by examining
measures of operating performance for targets in the years before acquisition (for
instance Hasbrouck (1985) and Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989)). The results
reported from these studies varied. Some presented strong evidence of
underperformance (Smiley (1976)) and some found no evidence of abnormal
performance at all. (Franks and Mayer (1996); Agrawal and Jaffe (2003)) These
mixed results, could simply indicate that takeovers are motivated by many factors and
being poorly managed is just one of them, although it remains perhaps an important
factor.
Due to both time constraints and limited data availability, it is not the aim of this
chapter to attempt to predict the acquisition probability of a listed firm in China. What
is of concern here is the impact of a target's previous performance on stock returns
during M&As or acquisitions of control. After the government started the enterprise
136 Brealey and Myers (1991)
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reform in urban areas, it was determined to promote a "competitive market-driven"
environment for enterprises. This proved to be difficult as the operations of many
SOEs were still heavily affected by the government, even after they were listed. As
noted in Chapter 2, it was not uncommon for local government to give administrative
"orders", requiring legal-person shares to be sold to other legal-persons. If the "order"
happens to assign some underperformed firms to a better management, such a
transaction might create value since the market would expect improvement in the
target's performance. If, however, a good performing firm is "ordered" to sell its legal-
person shares, it is logical to expect less or no value creation. A target's performance
preceding an acquisition therefore remains a vital explanatory variable of anticipated
future performance in Chinese M&As.
Changes in the annual Net Return On Assets ratios (NROA) are used as proxies for
company's previous profitability/performance. Two annual NROA ratios were
obtained from target firms' annual reports prior to year 0: NROA-2 and NROA-i,
where year 0 was when the event took place. Each target's previous performance is
then defined as NROA-i minus NROA-2. If the difference is positive, i.e., NROA-i is
greater than NROA-2, then the target is viewed as good or "recovering" in
performance; if the difference is negative, hence, NROA-i is smaller than NROA-2,
the performance is poor or "declining". This defining method may be simple, but a
number of researchers (Chen, 1999) find NROA ratios are accurate in terms of
measuring firms' performances especially in the Chinese context, where it has been
documented that stock returns may not properly reflect firms' performances due to the
immature nature of the Chinese stock markets. It is also worth noting that the Chinese
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Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) uses the NROA ratio as a basic index to
measure a listed firm's performance.
Dividing the data sample into sub-groups according to their previous performance
before the event can therefore provide insights into the nature of the incentives behind
the Chinese M&As and may also provide an explanation for observed differences in
excess returns.
5.1.8 Summary
Section 5.1 described seven explanatory variables for further exploration of abnormal
returns for targets' A share shareholders around the announcement of M&As or
acquisitions of control in China. These variables, as explained individually, are
chosen based on the previous research findings and an analysis of Chinese securities
markets' unique characteristics. Detailed description of sub-groups and dividing
criteria will be presented in the following section.
5.2 Data and Hypotheses
This section presents statistical descriptions of each pair of sub-samples grouped
according to different explanatory variables outlined in Section 5.1. Seven pairs of
sub-groups are formed - each pair is to test a specific hypothesis.
After the sub-groups are created, the same methodology as detailed in Chapter 4,
Section 4.4, was followed to calculate average abnormal returns (AARs), and
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cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are also computed for each sub-group.
T-statistic values are computed using equations 4.14 and 4.15.
5.2.1 Location
The locations where the targets are listed: the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), are identified as a geographic variable. A total
sample of 160 targets was then divided into two sub-groups, the Shanghai Group and
the Shenzhen Group, as shown in Table 5.2.1 below.
Table 5.2.1 Location Groups





Ho: The mean abnormal return for target firms listed on the SHSE equals the mean
abnormal return for target firms listed on the SZSE.
5.2.2 Industry Effect
Two sub-groups were formed according to their industry type: those that were
classified as "Industrial" vs. non-Industrial, as shown in Table 5.2.2 below.






Ho: The mean abnormal return for target firms classified as Industrial equals the mean
abnormal return for target firms classified as non-Industrial.
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5.2.3 Time Line
As shown in Table 5.2.3 below, the data sample of 160 firms was divided into two
sub-samples based on the announcement dates. If the announcements of M&As were
made before 1 July 1999 when the Securities Law became effective, they were
classified as Pre-Law; If after, Post-Law.
Table 5.2.3 Time-line Groups





Ho: The mean abnormal return for target firms acquired before 1 July 1999 equals the
mean abnormal return for target firms acquired after 1 July 1999.
5.2.4 Firm Size
The forth variable is measured by the book values of the total assets of the target firms.
The median of firm sizes was chosen as the dividing criterion because the size
distribution was skewed. If a target's size is greater than the median, it is classified as
a "bigger firm", whereas if the size of a target firm is smaller than the median, it is
classified as a "smaller firm." Table 5.2.4a and Table 5.2.4b below provide descriptive
statistics of firm sizes for all 160 targets.
Table 5.2.4a Firm-size Groups






Table 5.2.4b Size Descriptive Statistics



























t statistic (mean = 0) 9.414
t statistic p-value 0.000
lower 95% c.i. 514.189
upper 95% c.i. 787.213
# of values > 0 160.000
sign test p-value 0.000
Sum of sign ranks (med = 0) 12880
Wilcoxon p-value 0.000
Ho: The mean abnormal return for "Bigger" target firms equals the mean abnormal
return for "Smaller" target firms.
5.2.5 A Share Proportion
The median of all targets' A share percentages was used to divide the total sample into
two sub-groups: those with a higher A share percentage and those with lower A share
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percentage, e.g. Higher A% vs. Lower A%. Table 5.2.5a and 5.2.5b provide
descriptive statistics for the fifth explanatory variable.
Table 5.2.5a A Share Proportion Groups





Table 5.2.5b A% Descriptive Statistics



























t statistic (mean = 0) 36.923
t statistic p-value 0.000
lower 95% c.i. 0.326
upper 95% c.i. 0.363
# of values > 0 160
sign test p-value 0.000
Sum of sign ranks (med = 0) 12880
Wilcoxon p-value 0.000
Ho: The mean abnormal return for target firms of the "Higher A%" group equals the
mean abnormal return for target firms of the "Lower A%" group.
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5.2.6 Voting Power
160 targets were divided into two sub-groups according to the percentage of Legal-
person shares involved in the transaction. A percentage greater than the median
percentage of legal-person shares involved would be a proxy for higher voting power.
Table 5.2.6a Voting-Power Groups











Mode (0.28 ; 0.2)





















t statistic (mean = 0) 32.755
t statistic p-value 0.000
lower 95% c.i. 0.291
upper 95% c.i. 0.328
# of values > 0 160
sign test p-value 0.000
Sum of sign ranks (med = 0) 12880
Wilcoxon p-value 0.000
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Table 5.2.6a and 5.2.6b above provided descriptive statistics for the Higher Voting
Power group and the Lower Voting Power group.
Ho: The mean abnormal return for target firms of the "Higher Voting-power" group
equals the mean abnormal return for target firms of the "Lower Voting-power" group.
5.2.7 Previous Performance
If NROA-i is greater than NROA-2 for any target, that indicates that the target's
profitability/performance is improving, hence, NROA-i - NROA-2 > 0. If however,
NROA-i - NROA-2 <= 0, the target's performance can be viewed as declining or non-
improving. Accordingly two sub-groups were formed: Previous Target Performance +
(improving) vs. Previous Target Performance - (declining) as shown in Table 5.2.7
below.
Table 5.2.7 Previous Performance Group





Ho: The mean abnormal return for target firms with an improving performance history
equals the mean abnormal return for target firms with a declining or non-improving
performance history.
After seven explanatory variables were identified and described, the following section
presents detailed empirical results and the interpretations.
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5.3 Empirical Results and Analysis
The total sample of 160 targets is divided into seven pairs of sub-groups according to
the criteria specified above. Following the same event study technique described in
Chapter 4, a comprehensive comparison is then conducted between each pair of sub¬
groups. In this section,
Four sets of tables are presented for each pair of sub-groups. Tables coded "...a" list
the daily average abnormal returns (AAR) from day-60 to+60 (121 days in total) and
the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). T-statistic values for AARs are also
listed. The results are computed from three models, the Market Model, the Mean-
Adjusted Model and the Market Adjusted Model. Tables coded "...b" present a list of
CAARs based on six different event windows. Day-60 to day+60; day-20 to day+20,
day-10 to day+10, day-5 to day+5, day-1 to day+1, day-1 to day 0. CAARs calculated
from all three models and t-statistic values are presented. Tables coded "...c" present
a comparison of pre- and post- event CAARs and their t values. Please note, however,
that although results calculated from all the three models are presented and tested at
both the 5% and 1% significance levels, the description and analysis of the empirical
results in this section primarily focuses on the Market Model results at 5%
significance level. Finally, in order to test the null hypotheses proposed in Section 5.2,
Tables coded "...d" are formed to present two-tailed test results using a simple paired
comparison method. The Market Model results for all event windows (six different
event windows, four pre-event windows and four post- event windows) are compared
and tested at the 95% confidence level.




Table 5.3.1a shows detailed empirical results for the targets listed on the SZSE and
SHSE, respectively. For those firms listed on the SZSE, all three models identified
significant positive abnormal returns as early as day -54. Similarly, positive abnormal
returns are also identified in Shanghai market as early as day -55. As was discussed in
Chapter 4, it is possible that the reason for this early adjustment lies in the data sample:
it could be the effect of certain outliers (maybe a very unique case) or more likely
because of a noise effect.
A further look at the table towards day 0 reveals more interesting results, and the two
markets appear to behave differently. Significant positive abnormal returns start to
appear on the Shenzhen market in the immediate days before the event date, day -4, -3
and -1, at the 0.05 significance level, indicating the SZSE was adjusting quickly to the
forthcoming event. Nonetheless, this might be caused by short-term information
leakage. Shanghai group, on the other hand, does not identify any abnormal returns
for the days immediately before the event day for Shanghai market. Instead, positive
abnormal returns are identified slightly earlier, at day-16, -12 and -9. If short-term
information leakage is the cause of these price adjustments just prior to the
announcement date, then it appears that the information was leaked earlier regarding
the target firms listed in Shanghai market than in Shenzhen market. As analysed in
section 5.1.1, this difference may have been caused by the different characteristics of
the firms listed on two exchanges. The two markets also appear to react differently on
event day 0: no abnormal return is identified for the Shenzhen group but a significant
positive abnormal return of 0.78% was observed for the Shanghai group.
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Significant abnormal returns continue to be identified in the Shenzhen market after
the announcement dates on day+1, +7 and +9. A significant negative abnormal return
of -0.76% was seen on day +7, although not economically significant, indicates that
the A share prices may have overreacted to the announcement around the event date
in the Shenzhen market. No abnormal returns were recognised in the SHSE until
day+21.
Above results, however, should not lead to casual statements that the Shenzhen
market is not efficient in terms of fully reflecting publicly available information, or
that the Shanghai market is not efficient in terms of immediately reflecting the
publicly available information that is embodied in the announcement. As was
discussed in the Chapter 4, if an announcement was made after the market closes on
day 0, the market would only react on day 1. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the
above results might well indicate some differences between the efficiency of the two
markets.
Table 5.3.1b below presents the CAARs based on seven different event windows
centred on day 0 for the two markets. Positive CAARs are identified for all event
windows for the two markets. The CAARs across day-60 to day+60 are also presented
graphically in Figure 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b below, for companies listed in the SZSE and
SHSE respectively. The results suggest that both markets anticipate these corporate
restructuring activities as "value-adding" and acquisitions of control bring benefits to
the shareholders of targeted firms.
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—o— Mkt Model —*— Mean Adjst Rtn Model —a— Mkt Adjst Rtn Model DATE
Figure 5.3.1a CAAR in Shenzhen Market
Mkt Model —*— Mean Adjst Rtn Model —a— Mkt Adjst Rtn Model DATE
Figure 5.3.1b CAAR in Shanghai Market
In order to gain a better understanding of the added value, Table 5.3.1c was formed to
compare CAARs from event windows both before and after day 0. Take the Market
Model results for instance: there are significant positive abnormal returns in pre-event
windows: day-60 to day-1, day-20 to day-1, day-10 to day-1 for both markets, and in
addition, a significant positive abnormal return is also identified for day-5 to day-1 for
the SZSE. Although negative CAARs are identified for the event window
immediately after the announcement, they are not statistically significant. These
results confirm that the shareholders of the target firms gain prior to the M&As'
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released to the public, however, M&A activities announcements conveyed no new
information, in either market.
In order to test if there is any difference between the two markets (hence, a two-tailed
test is appropriate) in terms of the wealth created around the M&A announcements,
Table 5.3.1d T-Test for Location Subgroup
Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai
(Day-60 - Day+60) (Day-60 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+60)
Mean 0.0447 0.0731 0.1431 0.1920 -0.0599 -0.0577
Variance 0.1295 0.1152 0.1449 0.0957 0.0950 0.0982
Observations 121 60 60
Pearson Correlation 0.1244 0.0449 -0.0486
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 120 59 59
t Stat -0.6744 -0.7897 -0.0391
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.2507 0.2164 0.4845
t Critical one-tail 1.6577 1.6711 1.6711
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.5014 0.4329 0.9690
t Critical two-tail 1.9799 2.0010 2.0010
(Day-^0 - bay+20) (Day-20 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+20)
Mean 0.1571 0.1312 0.3244 0.2617 -0.0232 -0.0317
Variance 0.1594 0.1122 0.1474 0.1026 0.1209 0.0655
Observations 41 20 20
Pearson Correlation 0.2769 -0.0304 0.2117
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 40 19 19
t Stat 0.3730 0.5524 0.0992
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.3556 0.2935 0.4610
t Critical one-tail 1.6839 1.7291 1.7291
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.7111 0.5871 0.9220
t Critical two-tail 2.0211 2.0930 2.0930
(Day-10 - Day+10) (Bay-10 - Day-1) ^bay+1 - Day+10)
Mean 0.1917 0.0958 0.4160 0.2771 -0.0552 -0.1540
Variance 0.2675 0.1283 0.2432 0.0974 0.2219 0.0295
Observations 21 10 10
Pearson Correlation 0.3168 -0.2409 0.4511
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 20 9 9
t Stat 0.8329 0.6820 0.7399
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.2074 0.2562 0.2391
t Critical one-tail 1.7247 1.8331 1.8331
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.4147 0.5124 0.4782
t Critical two-tail 2.0860 2.2622 2.2622
(bay-!> - Day+fei (Day-5 - Day-lJ (Day+1 - bay+5J
Mean 0.3969 0.0895 0.7380 0.2025 0.0515 -0.1619
Variance 0.3132 0.1165 0.2528 0.0361 0.2355 0.0403
Observations 11 5 5
Pearson Correlation 0.3740 -0.3744 0.5526
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 10 4 4
t Stat 1.9036 1.9948 1.1636
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0431 0.0584 0.1546
t Critical one-tail 1.8125 2.1318 2.1318
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0861 0.1168 0.3093
t Critical two-tail 2.2281 2.7764 2.7764
(Day-1 - Day+1) (bay-1 - DayO)
Mean 0.8438 0.2165 0.8654 0.3488
Variance 0.2008 0.2402 0.3989 0.3754
Observations 3 2
Pearson Correlation -0.8419 -1
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0
df 2 1
t Stat 1.2065 0.5871
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.1755 0.3310
t Critical one-tail 2.9200 6.3138
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.3510 0.6620
t Critical two-tail 4.3027 12.7062
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paired sample t-tests were carried out for all event windows and the detailed results
are presented in Table 5.3.Id. The daily AARs calculated using the Market Model
throughout 14 different event windows138 were compared and tested at the 0.05
significance level. The fact that no t-value is significant shows that the null hypothesis
of equality of the mean abnormal returns for the two markets cannot be rejected and it
is concluded that the degree of abnormal returns for the target firms is the same
regardless of the location they are listed on, e.g. Shanghai or Shenzhen.
The above finding is consistent with previous theoretical arguments. Although China
has two stock exchanges, they are performing identical functions and according to the
empirical results presented above, they react to the same type of news, M&A
announcements in this case, very similarly.
5.3.2 Industry Effect
Table 5.3.2a lists detailed AARs obtained from all three models throughout the event
window of day-60 to day+60 for the Industrial group and non-Industrial group.
At 0.05 significance level, the Market Model identifies abnormal returns earlier and
more frequently for non-industrial group (on day-54, -52, -49, -36, -32, -29, -20, -12)
compared to industrial group (only on day-40, -37, -12). For days immediately prior
to day 0, abnormal returns are recognised for the non-industrial group at day-6 and -4
(more interestingly, a non-significant negative abnormal return occurred on day 0 for
138 14 event windows are: (from left to right, then downwards) Day-60 to Day+60; Day-60 to Day-1;
Day+1 to Day+60; Day-20 to Day+20; Day-20 to Day-1; Day+1 to Day+20; Day-10 to Day+10; Day-
10 to Day-1; Day+1 to Day+10; Day-5 to Day+5; Day-5 to Day-1; Day+1 to Day+5; Day-1 to Day+1
and finally Day-1 to Day 0.
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the non-industrial group), whereas significant positive abnormal returns are seen at
day-9, -4, -3, -1 and day 0 for the industrial group.
Compared to the empirical results presented in Chapter 4 and Section 5.3.1, where
price adjustments were seen as early as day -55 and -54 across different markets, it is
now safe to conclude that early adjustments were from those non-industrial targets
classified as non-industrial, which include "Commercial," "Real Estate," "Utilities,"
"Financial" and "Miscellaneous" sections. Collectively, share prices of these firms are
influenced by more factors than those of "Industrial" firms. This might explain the
earlier and more frequent abnormal returns appearing in the non-industrial group in
the sample.
Figure 5.3.2a and 5.3.2b below graphically present the CAARs throughout the 121-





-60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
"O— Mkt Model —Mean Adjst Rtn Model —*>— Mkt Adjst Rtn Model DATE
Figure 5.3.2a CAAR for Industrial group
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Figure 5.3.2b CAAR for Non-Industrial group
Table 5.3.2b presents the CAARs for six different event windows centred on day 0 for
both groups. It clearly shows that significant positive CAARs are recognised for the
industrial group for the event period day-60 to day+60, day-20 to day+20, day-10 to
day+10, day-5 to day+5 and day-1 to day+1. On the contrary, no significant positive
CAARs were identified for the non-industrial group for the latter three windows.
Table 5.3.2c further shows that significant positive CAARs appear in all pre-event
windows for the two groups, indicating that market anticipates the forthcoming
corporate restructurings as "value-adding" for both non-industrial and industrial
companies. Whereas the non-industrial group's CAAR over day-60 to day-1 is 14.32%,
the industrial group's CAAR is only 7.10% for the same period. This indicates that the
market may have different expectations towards different industries. It perhaps
anticipates that a restructuring is more likely to happen to a non-industrial firm or that
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performance/profitability compared to those industrial ones. This is not surprising
because different industries, after all, bear different risks. A related interpretation is
perhaps that non-industrial companies are underperforming and underpriced
compared to the non-industrial group, which remains untested but a future research
topic.
The market, however, may be overly optimistic in evaluating the forthcoming
restructurings involving non-industrial companies. Notice that a significant negative
CAAR of -5.6% was identified for the non-industrial group between day+1 to day+60.
This could indicate the over-reaction of the market prior to the event.
Overall, A share shareholders within the industrial group seem to benefit more from
such activities and the market appears to view a takeover of non-industrial targets as
more "value-adding" than when industrial firms are targeted. Indeed, Table 5.3.2d
below attempts to test if the AARs are different for these two groups, i.e. industrial
and non-industrial.
T-stat values presented in the table below provide limited evidence. The degree of
average abnormal returns for the target firms are statistically different for the two
groups only for the pre-event window day-60 to day-1, indicated by the bold t-value.
The abnormal returns do not appear to be different across all other event windows.
The null hypothesis of equality of the mean abnormal returns for targets from
different industries therefore is rejected for the pre-event window from day-60 to day-
1, but not to other periods.
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Table 5.3.2d T-Test for Industry Effect Subgroup
Industrial Non-lnd. Industrial Non-lnd. Industrial Non-lnd.
(Day-60 - Day+60)_ (Day-60 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+60)
Mean 0.0512 0.0680 0.1183 0.2387 -0.0366 -0.0933
Variance 0.1024 0.1456 0.1019 0.1211 0.0680 0.1136
Observations 121 60 60
Pearson Correlation 0.1609 0.1648 0.0836
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 120 59 59
t Stat -0.4064 -2.1610 1.0760
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.3426 0.0174 0.1432
t Critical one-tail 1.6577 1.6711 1.6711
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.6852 0.0348 0.2863
t Critical two-tail 1.9799 2.0010 2.0010
(Day-20 - Day+20) (bay-£6 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+20)
Mean 0.1710 0.1054 0.2897 0.3042 -0.0035 -0.0635
Variance 0.1362 0.1478 0.0917 0.1006 0.0826 0.1202
Observations 41 20 20
Pearson Correlation 0.2284 0.2916 0.1956
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 40 19 19
t Stat 0.8977 -0.1754 0.6638
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.1873 0.4313 0.2574
t Critical one-tail 1.6839 1.7291 1.7291
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.3747 0.8626 0.5148
t Critical two-tail 2.0211 2.0930 2.0930
(Day-10 - Day+10) (Day-10 - Day-f) (Day+1 - Day+10)
Mean 0.2373 0.0090 0.3957 0.2840 -0.0262 -0.2159
Variance 0.1945 0.2072 0.0873 0.1235 0.1173 0.1688
Observations 21 10 10
Pearson Correlation 0.3162 0.4325 0.2869
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 20 9 9
t Stat 1,9960 1.0162 1.3236
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0299 0.1680 0.1091
t Critical one-tail 1.7247 1.8331 1.8331
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0597 0.3361 0.2183
t Critical two-tail 2.0860 2.2622 2.2622
(Day-5 - Day+5) (Day-5 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+5)
Mean 0.3603 0.0922 0.5284 0.4317 0.0068 -0.1304
Variance 0.2601 0.1951 0.1011 0.0256 0.1425 0.1708
Observations 11 5 5
Pearson Correlation 0.2334 0.8986 0.3301
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 10 4 4
t Stat 1.5029 1.1516 06686
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0819 0.1568 0.2702
t Critical one-tail 1.8125 2.1318 2.1318
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1638 0.3136 0.5403
t Critical two-tail 2.2281 2.7764 2.7764
(t)ay-H - Day+1) (C)ay-1 - Dayi)
Mean 0.9084 0.0075 1.0453 -0.0184
Variance 0.1149 0.2264 0.1174 0.4488
Observations 3 2
Pearson Correlation -0.7774 -1
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0
df 2 1
t Stat 2.0277 1.4857
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0899 0.1886
t Critical one-tail 2.9200 6.3138
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1798 0.3772
t Critical two-tail 4.3027 12.7062
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5.3.3 Time Line
The 1st July 1999 (The Securities Law became effective) was chosen as the dividing
creation here to form two sub-groups according to the time when M&As were
announced. Detailed AARs and their t-values are presented in Table 5.3.3a below.
Important regulatory changes would undoubtedly affect the financial markets and
M&A activities. As it shows by Table 5.3.3a, there are clear differences between the
two sub-groups.
A number of significant positive abnormal returns are acknowledged by the Market
Model at 95% confidence level for the post-law group approaching the event date
(day-49, -48, -37, -32, -20, -13, -12, -6, -4, -3, and relatively large significant positive
abnormal returns on day-1 and day 0). On the other hand, only five significant
positive abnormal returns are identified at day-54, -52, -47 and closer to the event at
day-4 and day-3 at the same confidence level for the pre-law group. Notice that there
were no significant abnormal returns in day-1 to day 0 for the Pre-Law group but
there were positive abnormal returns on these days for the Post-Law group.
This would appear to suggest that after the change in the law, greater information
leakage occurred than in the earlier regime. Before rushing to a conclusion, it is
perhaps worth clarifying that the Chinese stock market, especially in its starting
period, was known to be an irrational one. Share prices were often pushed away from
their fundamental values and short-term speculative investing behaviours were very
common. Earlier tests of the EMH in the Chinese context often concluded that the
223
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































market was not informationally efficient (Ma 2000). As shall be revealed later in this
section, the pre-law market was unable to anticipate and adjust correctly to the
forthcoming corporate restructuring activities.
Figure 5.3.3a and 5.3.3b below graphically show the CAARs for the two groups for
day-60 to day+60. The following Table 5.3.3b further presents all CAARs for all six
different event windows centred on day 0.
-60 -50
-Mkt Model
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
Mean Adjst Rtn Model —a— Mkt Adjst Rtn Model DATE
Figure 5.3.3a CAARs for Pre-Law Group
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
—x— Mean Adjst Rtn Model —a— Mkt Adjst Rtn Model DATE








EventWindow -60-+60(121days) -20+20(41days) -10-+10(2days) -5+(11days) -1+(3days) -10(2days)
CAARtsig 1.90%0.56 2.81%1.42 1.37%0.97 1.15%.13 0.63%1.18 0.20%.47
CAARtsig 10.94%2.70** 6.59%2.79** 2.41%1.43 1.50%.23 0.83%1. 0 0.31%.59
CAARtsig 18.41%5 3** 8.68%4.40** 4.43%3.14** 2.66%. 0 1.00%.87 0.49%1.13
CAARtsig 11.06%3.93** 8.46%5.16** 4.47%3.81** 4.12%.85"* 2.49%5.61 2.09%5.78
CAARtsig 11.53%3.33"* 6.87%3.41** 3.30%2.29 4.22%.04"* 2.20%4.04 1.82%4.09
























































































































































Table 5.3.3b above indicates that although positive CAARs were identified for event
windows centred by event day 0 for the pre-law group, none of them are significant.
In clear contrast, significant CAARs were acknowledged for most event windows for
the post-law group (day-60 to day+60; day-20 to day+20; day-5 to day+5 and day-1 to
day+1). It is therefore tempting to conclude that M&As were not creating values for
targets' shareholders before 1 July 1999, compared to the gains obtained by the
shareholders of the targets after 1 July 1999.
However, the results from Table 5.3.3c above prove that above statement might not be
entirely correct. Significant positive abnormal returns were indeed identified prior to
the event date day 0 for the pre-law group (day-60 to day-1). Value was created for
the targets' shareholders before 1 July 1999 by M&As. The significant negative
abnormal returns immediately following the event date (day+1 to day+60) however
offset the value created, thus resulting a non-significant abnormal return for period of
day-60 to day+60. The pre-law market clearly over-reacted to the forthcoming
corporate event and adjusted the share prices, presumably, to their fundamental values
only after the event. The reason for this is most likely due to insider control as
explained in Chapter 2. The share prices were gradually pushed to a higher value
(away from the fundamental values) before the event (by the big players with access
to the inside information) and when the event was eventually disclosed to the general
public via official/unofficial channels, less-educated and poorly-informed smaller
investors rushed in to buy. This strategy used by the big players/insiders has been well
documented (Yao (1998), Ma (2000)). In addition, no significant negative CAARs are
apparent in post-event periods for the post-law group. This indicates that the post-law
market fully anticipated the forthcoming event, without the need for further
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adjustment. It would however be nai've to state that the big players control or insider
trading has disappeared all together.
Results from Table 5.3.3a, b and c reveal that the post-law market was anticipating
and adjusting more promptly and more correctly than the pre-law market. .
Table 5.3.3d T-Test for Time Line Subgroup
Pre-1/7/99 Pro-1/7/99 Pre-1/7/99 Pro-1/7/99 Pre-1/7/99 Pro-1/7/99
(Day-60 - Day+60) (Day-60 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+60)
Mean 0.0157 0.0914 0.1619 0.1687 -0.1314 -0.0010
Variance 0.1350 0.1086 0.1019 0.1212 0.1289 0.0709
Observations 121 60 60
Pearson Correlation 0.1574 0.1353 -0.0253
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 120 59 59
t Stat -1.8378 -0.1205 -2.2325
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0343 0.4523 0.0147
t Critical one-tail 1.6577 1.6711 1.6711
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0686 0.9045 0.0294
t Critical two-tail 1.9799 2.0010 2.0010
(Day-20 - Day+20) (Day-20 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+20)
Mean 0.0684 0.2064 0.2431 0.3371 -0.1063 0.0360
Variance 0.1596 0.1261 0.0963 0.1204 0.1755 0.0634
Observations 41 20 20
Pearson Correlation 0.2572 0.1215 0.0790
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 40 19 19
t Stat -1.9147 -0.9625 -1.3496
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0314 0.1739 0.0965
t Critical one-tail 1.6839 1.7291 1.7291
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0627 0.3479 0.1930
t Critical two-tail 2.0211 2.0930 2.0930
(Bay-10 - Day+1 (5) (Day-10 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Uay+10)
Mean 0.0651 0.2130 0.3834 0.3265 -0.2536 0.0209
Variance 0.2375 0.1654 0.0970 0.1689 0.2054 0.0744
Observations 21 10 10
Pearson Correlation 0.3676 0.0204 0.4106
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 20 9 9
t Stat -1.3367 0.3520 -2.0552
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0982 0.3665 0.0350
t Critical one-tail 1.7247 1.8331 1.8331
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1963 0.7329 0.0700
t Critical two-tail 2.0860 2.2622 2.2622
^^Day-5 - Day+S) (Day-5 - Day-1 J (Bay+1 - Day+5)
Mean 0.1045 0.3746 0.5310 0.4579 -0.3148 0.1663
Variance 0.3059 0.1826 0.0692 0.2207 0.2480 0.0753
Observations 11 5 5
Pearson Correlation 0.2931 -0.3101 0.4638
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 10 4 4
t Stat -1.5141 0.2699 -2.4265
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0805 0.4003 0.0361
t Critical one-tail 1.8125 2.1318 2.1318
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1609 0.8006 0.0723
t Critical two-tail 2.2281 2.7764 2.7764
(bay-1 - Day+1) (Day-1 - DayO)
Mean 0.2091 0.8285 0.1013 1.0455
Variance 0.0359 0.1433 0.0021 0.0042
Observations 3 2
Pearson Correlation -0.9579 1
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0
df 2 1
t Stat -1.9065 -69.4519
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0984 0.0046
t Critical one-tail 2.9200 6.3138
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1968 0.0092
t Critical two-tail 4.3027 12.7062
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discussed in Chapter 2, the Securities Law has brought in regulatory improvement and
the improvement is reflected in the post-law sub-group. Chinese securities markets are
improving in terms of the regulatory environment and its efficiency. This finding
agrees with findings such as that of Li et al. (2000) who conclude that the market
efficiency improved from 1994 to 1999.
Table 5.3.3d above presents t-values for the null hypothesis test proposed in section
5.2.3. It is found that the t-stats are significant for event periods of day+1 to day+60
and day-1 to day 0, respectively, therefore rejecting the null hypothesis of equality of
the mean abnormal returns for pre- and post-law targets for these event windows.
5.3.4 Firm Size
Compared to the previous three variables, "size effect" has been more intensively
researched in the western literature. This section will attempt to investigate the affects
of target size on abnormal returns around the M&A announcements in China.
According to Table 5.3.4a below, for bigger targets there are earlier significant (at
0.05 level, by the Market Model) abnormal returns (day-55, -54, -51, -48, -47, -21 and
day-12) and more frequently towards the event day (day-9, day-5, day-4, day-2, day-1
and day 0). There were far fewer instances of significant abnormal returns prior to
day-4 for smaller targets. This result is even clearer if using the 1% significance
level. There appears to be more information 139 available for the bigger
139 Note that the term "information" used here does not only refer to publicly available information, it
might also include inside information such as plans for a takeover, and noise such as rumours,
indirectly related news, wrong information, etc.
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targets, hence longer adjusting windows. This is consistent with the existence of a
positive correlation between firm size and the amount of information available to the
market (Barry and Brown 1984).
If less information is available about smaller firms, they should theoretically be riskier
than larger ones. If returns are calculated without regard to the effects of information
related risk - the forthcoming takeovers, for instance - and smaller firms would be
expected to generate more abnormal returns (Barry and Brown 1984). Abnormal
returns generated around the M&A announcements in Chinese securities markets,
however, do not provide supporting evidence for this argument.
Figure 5.3.4a and b below chart the CAARs for both bigger and smaller targets.
Figure 5.3.4a CAARs for Bigger Targets
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Figure 5.3.4b CAARs for Smaller Targets
Table 5.3.4b below shows that positive abnormal returns were acknowledged for all
event windows centred by day 0, with returns from periods of day-20 to day+20, day-
10 to day+10, day-5 to day+5 and day-1 to day+1 being significant for bigger targets
and results from day-60 to day+60 and day-20 to day+20 only, being significant for
smaller targets. Small target group's A share shareholders seem to receive higher
abnormal returns for the periods of day-60 to day+60 (9.37%) and day-20 to day+20
(6.00%), compared to the shareholders from big target group (4.62% and 5.90%
respectively). However, as later results from the paired t-tests shall reveal, these
differences are not significantly different.
Table 5.3.4c below reveals that prior to the event dates, the shareholders of the bigger
targets appear to benefit more compared to their counterparts in the smaller targets,
which is not consistent with the relevant Western literature. Noticeably, the
shareholders of bigger targets experience a significant negative abnormal return
during day+1 to day+60 following the event whereas smaller sized targets do not.
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EventWindow 60-+60(121days) -20+2(41days) -10-+10(2days) -5-+5(11days) -1+(3days) -10(2days)
CAARtsig 4.62%1.62 5.90%3.57"* 3.93%. 2** 3.95%4.60"* 1.99%4.45 1.71%4.67
CAARtsig 11.46%3 31"* 6.13%3.04** 3.18%2.21 4.09%3. 2"* 1.80%3.30 1.40%3.15
CAARtsig 17.42%6 07"* 10.09%6 4** 6.30%5.27"* 5.15%.96"* 2.30%5. 9 1.88%5.11
CAARtsig 9.37%2.95** 6.00%3.24** 2.26%1.71 1.66%.73 1.33%2.66 0.80%1.96
CAARtsig 11.08%2 90"* 7.36%3.31** 2.62%1.65 1.95%.69 1.39%2.31 0.90%1.84
CAARtsig 23.13%7 3"* 10.80%5 72** 4.72%3.49** 2.93%3.00 1.68%3.29 1.09%2.60
Significantat0.01level*Sign ficant0.05level



























































































































































This indicates that the market may be overly optimistic in viewing the forthcoming
restructurings for larger targets and over-reacted prior to the event day.
To test the null hypothesis specified in section 5.2.4 that the mean abnormal return for
"Bigger" target firms equals the mean abnormal return for "Smaller" target firr
Table 5.3.4d T-Test for Firm Size Subgroup
Size-Big Size-Small Size-Big Size-Small Size-Big Size-Small
(Day-60 - Day+60) (Day-60 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+60)
Mean 0.0382 0.0775 0.1779 0.1534 -0.1126 -0.0052
Variance 0.1269 0.1107 0.1185 0.1059 0.0893 0.1037
Observations 121 60 60
Pearson Correlation 0.1719 0.1587 -0.0443
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 120 59 59
t Stat -0.9744 0.4367 -1.8531
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.1659 0.3320 0.0344
t Critical one-tail 1.6577 1.6711 1.6711
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.3318 0.6639 0.0689
t Critical two-tail 1.9799 2.0010 2.0010
(Day-20 - Day+20) (Day-20 - Day-1) (Bay+1 - Day+20)
Mean 0.1439 0.1464 0.3187 0.2721 -0.0585 0.0042
Variance 0.1480 0.1282 0.1177 0.1014 0.1026 0.1247
Observations 41 20 20
Pearson Correlation 0.2820 0.1445 0.0261
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 40 19 19
t Stat -0.0359 0.4813 -0.5956
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.4858 0.3179 0.2792
t Critical one-tail 1.6839 1.7291 1.7291
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.9715 0.6358 0.5585
t Critical two-tail 2.0211 2.0930 2.0930
(Day-10 - Day+10) (Day-10 - Day-1) (bay+1 - Day+10)
Mean 0.1871 0.1077 0.3831 0.3204 -0.0598 -0.1420
Variance 0.1942 0.1684 0.1528 0.1377 0.1395 0.1017
Observations 21 10 10
Pearson Correlation 0.4786 0.0006 0.4743
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 20 9 9
t Stat 0.8364 0.3680 0.7264
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.2064 0.3607 0.2430
t Critical one-tail 1.7247 1.8331 1.8331
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.4128 0.7214 0.4860
t Critical two-tail 2.0860 2.2622 2.2622
(Day-5 - Day+5) /Bay-5 - Day-11 (Day+1 - Day+5)
Mean 0.3587 0.1508 0.6717 0.3090 -0.0218 -0.0727
Variance 0.1892 0.2095 0.0586 0.2513 0.0826 0.1520
Observations 11 5 5
Pearson Correlation 0.5151 -0.2388 0.7998
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 10 4 4
t Stat 1.5671 1.3372 0.4838
P(T<=t) one-taii 0.0741 0.1261 0.3269
t Critical one-tail 1.8125 2.1318 2.1318
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1482 0.2521 0.6538
t Critical two-tail 2.2281 2.7764 2.7764
(Day-1 - Day+1) (Day-1 - DayO)
Mean 0.6633 0.4440 0.8526 0.4003
Variance 0.1320 0.0117 0.0489 0.0119
Observations 3 2
Pearson Correlation -0.9396 -1
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0
df 2 1
t Stat 0.8145 1.9370
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.2505 0.1517
t Critical one-tail 2.9200 6.3138
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.5009 0.3034
t Critical two-tail 4.3027 12.7062
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Table 5.3.4d was constructed as above. None of the t-values are significant, hence, the
degree of average abnormal returns for the two groups is not statistically different.
Further analysis is needed in order to understand why the size effect does not exist in
the Chinese context, when using the sub-groups concerned in this study.
Western researchers in general explain the size effect in three ways.
1. Information and risk. As discussed earlier, larger firms would be associated with
more available information to the market. Smaller firms with less information
about them would be riskier. Rational investors would therefore demand a
premium to offset such risks (Klein and Bawa 1977). Additionally, in a mature
market, the announcement of a takeover bid for a smaller target will contain
relatively more information than an announcement for a larger target, and because
smaller firms reacted more severely than large firms when faced with "surprise"
such as the announcements (Brauer 1986), more abnormal returns are expected for
smaller targets.
2. Size and liquidity. Because size and liquidity are positively related, larger targets
will trade more frequently. Therefore, the premium offered by a bidder for a larger
target need not be as generous compared to that offered to smaller targets'
shareholders (Bradley 1986).
3. Outcome effect. Jensen and Ruback (1983) have asserted that different returns
might be associated with particular outcomes of the takeover process, such as
whether smaller targets are more likely to be subject to successful or subsequent
bids and whether the offers of larger targets are more likely to be withdrawn, etc.
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The above theories however, might not be able to be applied directly in the Chinese
context given the unique characteristics of Chinese corporate restructuring activities
and the immature nature of the Chinese stock markets. 1) As was shown by Table
5.3.4a, although more information seems to be available for larger targets in China, it
does not necessarily mean that larger firms are associated with fewer risks. In addition,
smaller targets did not appear to react "severely" when faced with "surprise" on day 0
(no significant abnormal return is identified on day 0 for smaller sized group). 2) With
a high percentage of non-tradable shares in a listed firm's share structure, it should not
be assumed that size and liquidity are positively associated in China. 3) The sub¬
groups were not divided further according to the outcomes. This could have affected
the results.
More realistically, that the size effect does not seem to be apparent in China could be
due to methodological issues and the data sample itself. 1) If the true beta of smaller
firms is greater than estimated, then the required rates of return for smaller firms will
be underestimated, and this may lead to overestimated abnormal returns; If the true
beta for larger firms is smaller than estimated then the required rates of return for
large firms will be overestimated, the abnormal returns may be underestimated. 2) As
noted in section 5.1.4, researchers from the West conventionally use relative size, i.e.
target size compared to acquirer size. The use of an absolute size here, the book value
of the assets of a listed firm obtained from its annual report - may not be accurate. 3)
Dividing the sample into sub-groups according to the median may not be too
appropriate either, and last but not least, 4) the accounting data published by the firms
could be less accurate than for western companies.
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In conclusion, the null hypothesis of equality of the mean abnormal returns for the
two groups cannot be rejected. The target size effect on shareholders' gain around the
M&A announcements is not present when analysed using the sub-groups divided
according to their book values of the total assets.
5.3.5 A Share Proportion
Table 5.3.5a below presents the AARs for Higher and Lower A% targets when
divided by the percentage of A shares in the share structure prior to the announcement.
As the table reveals, significant AARs for lower A% group are recognised earlier (on
day-54) and more frequently (on day-52, -49, -40, -36, -20, -13, -12, etc.) compared to
higher A% group (at day-48, -47, -24, -12, -11, etc.). This appears to provide support
to the argument in section 5.1.5 that a larger group of retail shareholders may be less
promptly informed of a certain corporate event compared to a smaller group of retail
investors, hence, the former may respond more slowly. Nonetheless, the difference in
the early adjustments should not be taken too literally because of the possible noise
effect included in the longer event window.
More interesting results are seen in the days immediately prior to and after the event
day. For the lower A% group, significant positive abnormal returns occur immediately
before the event date (day-6, -4 and -3) and on the event date (day 0), soon followed
by a series significant negative abnormal returns (day+3, +7, +8 and +10). As shall be
later revealed, over-reaction prior to the event may have caused this. Whereas for the
245











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































higher A% group, AARs are identified on day-9, -4 and -1, with no AAR after the
event day 0. This indicates that the share prices for higher A% group have been fully
adjusted prior to the event.
Figure 5.3.5a and b below provide graphic presentations of the CAARs for the two
sub-groups, respectively.
Mkt Model —*— Mean Adjst Rtn Model —ft—Mkt Adjst Rtn Model DATE
Figure 5.3.5a CAARs for Higher A% Group
—o~~ Mkt Model —*— Mean Adjst Rtn Model —ft— Mkt Adjst Rtn Model DATE
Figure 5.3.5b CAARs for Lower A% Group
Table 5.3.5b below shows that positive CAARs are identified for the higher A%
group in four event windows (day-60 to day+60, day-20 to day+20, day-10 to day+10
and day-5 to day+5), whereas positive CAARs are only observed for the lower A%
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Table5.3.5bCAARforSha ePr portionu gr up A%(High):80intotal
A%(Low):80int tal
Mktodel
CAARt 9.78%3.01 7.90%4.17 4.06%3.00 3.14%.21 1.65%3.23 1.29%3.09
MeanAdjstRtodel
MktAdjstRtnodel CAARtsig 23.67%7 14** 12.72%6 59** 6.58%4.77** 4.48%.48** 1.94%3.71 1.50%3.52
Mktodel
CAARt 4.21%1.48 4.01%2.42 2.13%1.80 2.46%.87 1.67%3. 3 1.22%3.32
MeanAdjstRtnodelkj ttModel
EventWindow -60-+60(121days) -20+2(41days) -10-+10(2days) -5+(11days) -1+(3days) -10(2days)
sig
CAAR 10.09% 7.21% 3.60% 3.20% 1.49% 1.02%
t
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group in two windows (day-20 to day+20 and day-5 to day+5). The difference is even
clearer if using the 1% significance level: no significant abnormal returns are
acknowledged for event windows centred on the event date for the lower A% group.
Table 5.3.5c above further revealed that the significant positive CAARs gained by the
lower A% group before the event date, for example, 9.40% for day-60 to day-1, were
offset by a significant abnormal return of -5.94% in the post-event window day+1 -
day+60. This offset does not appear in the higher A% group.
Although value is created prior to the announcement for both groups, the market
appears to have over-reacted to the event for lower-A% group prior to the event date.
This result could be due to insider control. One might expect that this control is easier
to exert if the A share percentage is relatively lower in a listed firm.
Further more, as discussed in section 5.1.5, the variable of A share percentage implies
the degree of privatisation, where the higher A% would mean a higher degree of
privatisation. If the degree of privatisation is positively associated with a firm's
(previous SOE) performance, then one should expect that shareholders from the
higher A% group receive more abnormal returns around the announcement date.
Table 5.3.5c shows that higher A% group receive higher CAARs for all pre-event
windows, that might give support to the above argument.
Table 5.3.5d is constructed to test if average abnormal returns are statistically
different between the two groups. The table showed no significant t-value and the null
hypothesis of equality of average abnormal returns is therefore not rejected.
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Table 5.3.5d T-Test for A Share Proportion Subgroup
A%(High) A%(Low) A%(High) A%(Low) A%(High) A%(Low)
(Day-60 - Day+60) (Day-60 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+60)
Mean 0.0809 0.0348 0.1747 0.1567 -0.0189 -0.0989
Variance 0.1089 0.1169 0.1171 0.0941 0.0832 0.1020
Observations 121 60 60
Pearson Correlation 0.2330 0.2321 -0.0035
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 120 59 59
t Stat 1.2184 0.3446 1.4384
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.1127 0.3658 0.0778
t Critical one-tail 1.6577 1.6711 1.6711
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.2254 0.7316 0.1556
t Critical two-tail 1.9799 2.0010 2.0010
(Day-20 - Day+20) /t)ay-20 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+20)
Mean 0.1926 0.0977 0.3375 0.2532 0.0355 -0.0898
Variance 0.1206 0.1667 0.1070 0.1193 0.0958 0.1477
Observations 41 20 20
Pearson Correlation 0.2343 0.1079 -0.0433
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 40 19 19
t Stat 1.2937 0.8395 1.1126
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.1016 0.2058 0.1399
t Critical one-tail 1.6839 1.7291 1.7291
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.2032 0.4116 0.2798
t Critical two-tail 2.0211 2.0930 2.0930
(Day-10 - Day+10) (Day-10 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+10)
Mean 0.1933 0.1014 0.4209 0.2826 -0.0585 -0.1433
Variance 0.1586 0.2320 0.1040 0.1336 0.1140 0.2340
Observations 21 10 10
Pearson Correlation 0.3779 0.2256 0.0188
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 20 9 9
t Stat 0.8498 1.0181 0.4587
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.2027 0.1676 0.3287
t Critical one-tail 1.7247 1.8331 1.8331
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.4055 0.3352 0.6573
t Critical two-tail 2.0860 2.2622 2.2622
(Day-5 - Day+5) (Day-5 - Day-!) (Day+1 - Day+5)
Mean 0.2856 0.2239 0.5396 0.4410 0.0015 -0.0959
Variance 0.1387 0.2481 0.0649 0.0999 0.0946 0.2676
Observations 11 5 5
Pearson Correlation 0.5848 0.5407 0.1621
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 10 4 4
t Stat 0.4973 0.7913 0.3906
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.3149 0.2365 0.3580
t Critical one-tail 1.8125 2.1318 2.1318
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.6297 0.4731 0.7160
t Critical two-tail 2.2281 2.7764 2.7764
(Eay-1 - Day+b (t>ay-1 - Dayi)
Mean 0.5504 0.5570 0.6449 0.6081
Variance 0.0702 0.0245 0.0868 0.0333
Observations 3 2
Pearson Correlation -0.2988 -1
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0
df 2 1
t Stat -0.0331 0,1090
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.4883 0.4654
t Critical one-tail 2.9200 6.3138
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.9766 0.9309
t Critical two-tail 4.3027 12.7062
The private ownership (A-share percentage), does not appear to have a significant
impact on firm performance and its restructuring activities in China. Why the variable
lacks of explanatory power needs to be further analysed. Sun et al (2002) used pooled
regression on data from 1994 to 1997 and concluded that partial government
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ownership has a positive impact on SOE performance. In a later paper, the authors
took the issue further (Sun et al. (2003)) and found that state-ownership (state shares
percentage) had negative impacts on firm performance and legal-person ownership
(legal-person shares percentage) had positive impacts on firm performance after share
issuing privatisation. Therefore, a variable that measures the government ownership
(state share percentage and legal-person share percentage) may be of more
explanatory power than private ownership than the variable that was explored here.
Nonetheless, the results presented in this section indicate that A share shareholders, as
minority shareholders, have very insignificant influence over a company's
performance.
In summary, it is found that the degree of abnormal returns around the announcements
of M&As for the target firms is the same regardless the A share percentage in the
targets' share structure.
5.3.6 Voting Power
This variable is of particular interest since the A share percentage proved to lack
explanatory power.
Table 5.3.6a reveals only a few AARs for the high voting power group, and they tend
to occur immediately prior to and around the event day (day-51, -40, -13, -5, -4, -1,
day 0 and +1). For the low voting power group, significant AARs are identified over a
longer window (day-53, -50, -49, -47, -38, -37, -36, -16, -12, -9, -4 and -3) prior to the
event day.
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Figure 5.3.6a and 5.3.6b below chart the CAARs for the two groups.
—©— Mkt Model —w— Mean Adjst Rtn Model —4— Mkt Adjst Rtn Model DATE
Figure 5.3.6a CAARs for Higher Voting Power Group
—o— Mkt Model —*— Mean Adjst Rtn Model —a— Mkt Adjst Rtn Model DATE
Figure 5.3.6b CAARs for Lower Voting Power Group
Earlier it was argued that higher gains for targets' shareholders are to be expected if a
higher percentage of legal-person shares are bought/sold during the corporate
restructuring. Table 5.3.6b below further reveals that this is true.
At the 0.05 significance level, only one window (day-20 to day+20) showed a
significant change for the lower voting power group. Whereas positive CAARs for all
event windows, except day-1 to day 0, for the higher voting groups were identified
and were significant. In other words, when acquirers take over a target by buying a
smaller percentage of the total shares, this restructuring does not seem to benefit the
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targets' shareholders as much compared to transactions involving a higher percentage
of total shares. The market appears to be more optimistic in evaluating the acquisition
of a larger percentage of shares and it anticipates these activities as value-adding or
more value-adding then acquisition of a smaller percentage of shares.
Table 5.3.6c above further presented the CAARs from pre- and post- event windows.
It is apparent that value has been created for the higher voting power group before the
event date, and compared to the lower voting power group, these positive abnormal
returns were not only more significant, but also consistently higher.
Bold t-stats presented in Table 5.3.6d below indicate that the abnormal returns for the
two different groups are significantly different for the period day-60 to day+60, day-1
to day+1 and day-1 to day 0. Indeed the very large t-stat value for the period day-1 to
day 0 reflects the CAARs shown in Table 5.3.6c: 1.71% for the higher voting power
group versus 0.80% for the low voting power group.
The reasons behind this different degree of value creation are varied. The purchase of
a larger percentage of the shares itself perhaps already conveys more information than
the announcement of buying a smaller percentage. The higher voting power group
may be viewed as more capable and more determined to bring changes to the target.
With a higher control power, it is also easier for the new owner, via a greater control
in the board, to make fundamental changes if needed. That is, with a greater chance to
control the target, the acquirer may be expected to be more effective at reducing
agency loss than an acquirer who gains a smaller percentage of shares in the target.
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Table 5.3.6d T-Test for Voting Power Subgroup
Vpower-Hi Vpower-Lo Vpower-Hi Vpower-Lo Vpower-Hi Vpower-Lo
(Day-60 - Day+60) (Day-60 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+60)
Mean 0.0966 0.0190 0.2012 0.1302 -0.0200 -0.0978
Variance 0.1048 0.1084 0.1078 0.1141 0.0716 0.0781
Observations 121 60 60
Pearson Correlation 0.3055 0.1718 0.2325
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 120 59 59
t Stat 2.2180 1.2821 1.7782
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0142 0.1024 0.0403
t Critical one-tail 1.6577 1.6711 1.6711
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0284 0.2048 0.0805
t Critical two-tail 1.9799 2.0010 2.0010
(Day-20 - Day+20) (Day-20 - Day-1) (Day+1-Day+26i
Mean 0.1767 0.1137 0.3298 0.2610 -0.0085 -0.0457
Variance 0.1453 0.1107 0.1179 0.1076 0.1056 0.0728
Observations 41 20 20
Pearson Correlation 0.3856 0.1118 0.3125
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 40 19 19
t Stat 1.0145 0.6877 0.4736
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.1582 0.2500 0.3206
t Critical one-tail 1.6839 1.7291 1.7291
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.3165 0.5000 0.6412
t Critical two-tail 2.0211 2.0930 2.0930
(Day-10 - Day+10) (Day-10 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+lfl}
Mean 0.1821 0.1127 0.4133 0.2901 -0.1127 -0.0891
Variance 0.2053 0.1437 0.0880 0.1265 0.1673 0.1060
Observations 21 10 10
Pearson Correlation 0.5432 0.3608 0.3035
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 20 9 9
tStat 0.7895 1.0471 -0.1704
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.2195 0.1612 0.4342
t Critical one-tail 1.7247 1.8331 1.8331
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.4391 0.3224 0.8684
t Critical two-tail 2.0860 2.2622 2.2622
(Bay-3 - Bay+5l (Day-!) - Day-1 J (liay+1 - Day+S)
Mean 0.3438 0.1657 0.5559 0.4247 0.0368 -0.1313
Variance 0.2311 0.1579 0.0760 0.1560 0.2716 0.0357
Observations 11 5 5
Pearson Correlation 0.5618 0.0915 0.5406
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 10 4 4
tStat 1.4146 0.6370 0,8389
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0938 0.2794 0.2244
t Critical one-tail 1.8125 2.1318 2.1318
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1876 0.5587 0.4487
t Critical two-tail 2.2281 2.7764 2.7764
(Day-! - Day+1) (Day-1 - DayO)
Mean 0.8407 0.2667 0.8547 0.3983
Variance 0.0019 0.0538 0.0027 0.0037
Observations 3 2
Pearson Correlation 0.6977 1
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0
df 2 1
t Stat 4.8799 ■■ : : ■' : ( 72.8117
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0198 0.0044
t Critical one-tail 2.9200 6.3138
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0395 0.0087
t Critical two-tail 4.3027 12.7062
In conclusion, the null hypothesis of equality of the mean abnormal returns for the
higher and lower voting power groups is rejected for day-60 to day +60, day-1 to
day+1 and day-1 to day 0. The market reacts differently to acquisitions if they involve
transactions of different percentages of shares of the target. Moreover, the market
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appears to favour takeovers involving a higher voting power transfer to those
involving a lower voting power transfer.
5.3.7 Previous Performance
Although it could always be argued that even those firms with good management, can
in theory be improved by better management, target firms are believed to be targeted
("punished") because they tend to underperform and hence the inefficient
management hypothesis (Brealey and Myers (1991)).
1— IVkt Model Mean Adjst Rtn Model Mkt Adjst Rtn Model DATE
Figure 5.3.7a CAARs for Performing Firms
—o— Mkt Model Mean Adjst Rtn Model —a— Mkt Adjst Rtn Model DATE
Figure 5.3.7b CAARs for Non-Performing Firm
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The CAARs calculated from the Market Model illustrated in Figure 5.3.7a and 5.3.7b
show dramatically different patterns for the two groups. A further look at Table 5.3.7a
below also reveals the difference.
Table 5.3.7a below shows only three significant positive abnormal returns (0.69% at
day-32, -0.69% at day-22 and 0.67% at day-9) for the performing group until day 0
followed by a series of significant negative abnormal return on day+5, +10 and +15,
etc. This clearly indicates that the market is "surprised" by the announcement. For the
non-performing group though, share prices movement prior to event day shows a
familiar pattern as has been observed. The earliest abnormal return is acknowledged
on day-54. Moving towards the event day, there are more adjustments (day-51, -49, -
37, -22, -16, -13, -12, -11, -9, -4, -3 and day-1).
In addition, the flowing Table 5.3.7b below shows a clear cut difference between the
two groups. The CAAR for the performing group over 121-day window is -10.25%
(measured by the Market Model and significant at 0.01 level) while the CAAR for the
non-performing group over the same period is a significant 15.78%. It is obvious that
the restructuring of a performing company makes its shareholders lose out but taking
over a non-performing company is welcomed and anticipated to be value-adding by
the market.
The CAARs for pre- and post- day 0 presented in Table 5.3.7c further signify the
difference. For the non-performing group, CAARs are significantly positive for all the
pre-event windows (14.82% for day-60 to -1, 8.67% for day-20 to -1, 5.43% for day-
10 to -1 and 3.74% for day-5 to -1). On the other hand, negative CAARs are identified
266



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table5.3.7cPre-andost-EventCAARforP viousPerformaceSubgroup GoodPerf rmance:54int tal





EventWindow -601(60days) +1-60(6days) -201(20days) +1-20(2days) -10--1(1days) +1-+10(10days) -51(5days) +1-5(days)
CAAR 0.36% -12.21% 0.15% -4.47% -0.21% -3.00% -0.07% -1.71%
t 0.14 -4.71 0.30 -2.99 -0.20 -2.84 -0.09 -2.29
sig
CAAR 3.54% -12.86% 0.30% -5.24% -0.42% -3.66% -0.32% -1.68%
t
1.17 -4.26 0.36 -3.01 -0.34 -2.97 -0.37 -1.93
sig
CAARt 11.95%4 51 -0.70%-0.26 4.47%2.97 -0.70%-0.46 1.91%.77 -1.11%-1.02 1.19%.56 -0.96%-1.26
sig
**
CAARtsig 14.82%7 94** 0.89%.48 8.67%.06"* 1.46%.35 5.42%7.11"* 0.01%.01 3.74%6.93"* 0.52%.96
CAAR 19.21% 1.93% 10.54% 1.77% 5.77% 0.07% 4.38% 0.57%
t 8.21 0.82 7.50 1.31 6.04 0.07 6.49 0.85
sig
CAARtsig 19.35%0.31** 4.46%2.37 10.16%9 30** 2.67%.47 6.15%8.03** 0.69%. 0 4.15%7.66** 0.77%1.42
Significantat0.01level*Sign ficant0.05level
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for the performing group after the event day (-12.21% for day+1 to +60, -4.47% for
day+1 to +20 and -3.00% for day+1 to +10).
Indeed, the empirical results in this section reveal the most interesting finding in this
chapter. The differences of CAARs between the two groups have clear indications:
1) M&As create value for the non-performing targets, i.e. those companies that have
experienced a decline in their profitability, and the targets' shareholders gain from
such activities.
2) When a target is either recovering from a bad performing history or evolving from
a good performing history, measured by ANROA , then such restructuring is not
viewed as "value-adding" by the market, on the contrary, it is "value-demolishing"
and the shareholders of the target lose wealth.
3) Value is created before the announcement for the non-performing targets and value
is demolished only after the announcement for the performing targets. This indicates
that the market could anticipate the forthcoming restructurings involving poorly-
performing targets, but it failed to anticipate that a well-performing company to be
targetd.
Table 5.3.7d below shows the t-values for abnormal returns across all event windows
and shows that the abnormal returns for the non-performing and the performing
groups are significantly different for periods of day-60 to +60, day-60 to -1, day+1 to
+60, day-20 to +20, day-20 to -1, day+1 to day+20, day-10 to +10, day-10 to -1 and
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Table 5.3.7d T-Test for Previous Performance Subgroup
Perform(+) Perform(-) Perform(+) Perform(-) Perform(+) Perform(-)
(Day-60 - Day+60) (Day-60 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+60)
Mean -0.0847 0.1304 0.0061 0.2470 -0.2035 0.0148
Variance 0.1291 0.1094 0.1024 0.1123 0.0897 0.0828
Observations 121 60 60
Pearson Correlation 0.1289 0.0837 -0.0109
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 120 59 59
t Stat -5.1911 -4.2073 4.0499
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
t Critical one-tail 1.6577 1.6711 1.6711
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002
t Critical two-tail 1.9799 2.0010 2.0010
(Day-20 - Day+20) JBay-20 - Day-1) (Eay+1 - Day+20)
Mean -0.0591 0.2492 0.0226 0.4343 -0.2234 0.0729
Variance 0.1745 0.1427 0.0980 0.1265 0.0902 0.1034
Observations 41 20 20
Pearson Correlation 0.0846 -0.0806 0.0612
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 40 19 19
t Stat -3.6630 -3.7391 -3.1083
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0004 0.0007 0.0029
t Critical one-tail 1.6839 1.7291 1.7291
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0007 0.0014 0.0058
t Critical two-tail 2.0211 2.0930 2.0930
(Day-10 - Day+10) (T)ay-10 - Day-1) (Day+1 - Day+10)
Mean -0.0772 0.2618 -0.0214 0.5418 -0.3002 0.0006
Variance 0.2634 0.2058 0.1024 0.1315 0.1140 0.1591
Observations 21 10 10
Pearson Correlation 0.1302 0.0637 0.0949
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 20 9 9
tstat -2.4306 -3.8048 -1.9115
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0123 0.0021 0.0441
t Critical one-tail 1.7247 1.8331 1.8331
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0246 0.0042 0.0883
t Critical two-tail 2.0860 2.2622 2.2622
(Day-5 - Day+5) (bay-5 - Day-1) (t)ay+1 - Day+5)
Mean -0.0169 0.3932 -0.0136 0.7470 -0.3424 0.1032
Variance 0.3364 0.2649 0.0218 0.1530 0.0384 0.2221
Observations 11 5 5
Pearson Correlation -0.0273 -0.2570 0.0384
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 10 4 4
tStat -1.7307 -3.7607 -1.9791
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0571 0.0099 0.0595
t Critical one-tail 1.8125 2.1318 2.1318
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1142 0.0198 0.1189
t Critical two-tail 2.2281 2.7764 2.7764
(Day-1 - Day+1) /bay-1 - DayO)
Mean 0.3577 0.6535 0.6981 0.5900
Variance 1.1494 0.2784 1.6036 0.5326
Observations 3 2
Pearson Correlation -0.9315 -1
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0
df 2 1
tStat -0.3252 0.0766
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.3880 0.4757
t Critical one-tail 2.9200 6.3138
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.7759 0.9513
t Critical two-tail 4.3027 12.7062
day-5 to -1. These convincing results suggest previous performance has a vial impact
on target shareholders gain around the M&A announcements.
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Previous Western empirical studies generally conclude that target shareholders
enjoyed significantly positive returns (most are economically significant too) around
the M&A announcements in almost all cases. Jensen and Ruback (1983), Datta et al.
(1992) and Bruner (2002) provide extensive surveys of this literature, and report
average cumulative abnormal returns in the 20-30% range.
While the study carried out in Chapter 4 is consistent with the western literature that
value is created and that on average target shareholders gain from corporate
restructuring in China, Section 5.3.7 further shows that not all targets benefit from
M&As. Previously non-performing targets gain and previously performing targets
lose.
These give support to the value maximisation theory (Jensen (1998)) and inefficient
management hypothesis (Brealey and Myers (1991)). A poorly performing firm's
management is "punished" by a takeover, and the market anticipates that the takeover
is beneficial and would improve the target's performance, hence, value is created.
These results also support the non-value maximising conjectures such as the agency
cost theory (Jensen (1986)) and hubris hypotheses (Roll (1986)). When a target is
performing well, there is relatively less room left for improvement. If an acquirer is to
take over a well-performing target, driven by the manager's ambition or
miscalculation, or by a governmental "order", the market will view this takeover as
value-destroying!
The findings in this section are of particular importance in China as they have the
following three practical implications for investors, managers and the government.
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The first implication is minor yet important. Chinese domestic investors appear to be
able to anticipate what is implied in the accounting data published by the listed firms
and make a good use of it to assist their investment decision making. This also
clarifies why Net Return on Assets (NROA) ratios are indeed used by the CSRC as a
basic indicator to measure firm performance.
A more important implication is that if the managers propose to take over a well-
performing target, they are, from a pure economic point of view, making a wrong
investment decision, as was shown by the empirical results. Whereas the managers
could also be motivated by their personal ambitions, political desire, or simply wrong
calculation, a more interesting question is raised: what if they are "ordered" by the
government to do so?
The most important implication is that government may not be rational in its
intervention. Governmental involvement in SOEs has changed considerably over the
past two decades in China. Certain control has been loosened and compared to before
the reform, SOEs now enjoy more autonomy. Nonetheless, governmental intervening
is inevitable due to the transitional nature of the Chinese economy. Such interventions
can be shown from changes in a national law to a specific personnel change in a
specific firm. The consequences of these interventions are not entirely satisfactory.
Forcing a "wrong" takeover and subsequently approving the proposal, for instance,
harm the investors and decrease the target's value. More appropriate valuation and
approving procedures perhaps should be considered and followed.
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Having analysed the above, one should bear in mind the following argument when
attempting to criticise the irrational government intervention. On one hand, the
government may want to force listed firms to face greater competition and to increase
the efficiency of credit allocation to more SOEs. On the other hand, the government
has strong incentives to provide financial support to all firms and to prevent
bankruptcy and job losses, because of the heavy political and social costs that would
be engendered. Maybe after all, the government's intervention is intentional, and, even
rational.
5.4 Conclusion
By dividing the data sample into different sub-groups according to seven different
variables, wealth gains due to acquisitions of control in China have been studied in
detail. The explanatory variables are: location, industry effect, time line, firm sizes, A
share proportion, voting power and previous performance. Some of the variables
prove to have more explanatory power than others.
It is found that geographic variable does not make a difference in target shareholders'
gain around the announcements of M&As or acquisitions of control in China.
Whether targets are listed in the SZSE or SHSE, they do not appear to receive
different degrees of abnormal returns.
The stock markets in China may prefer non-industrial restructurings to industrial ones
as the shareholders of the industrial group seem to gain more. It is perhaps worthwhile
pointing out that the industrial classification methods were reviewed and changed in
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2001, which may alter the future findings using more recent data. Western literature
suggests that the degree of relatedness between the businesses of the buyer and seller
is positively associated with returns (Comment and Jarrell (1995), Healy et al. (1992,
1997)). This synergy hypothesis has not been tested in this chapter since it is difficult
to identify buyers' industry types. However, with more data becoming available, an
examination of this factor may shed light on whether synergy hypothesis applies to
the M&As or acquisitions of control in China.
The introduction of the Securities Law has brought improvements in the regulatory
environment in the Chinese stock markets and such improvements have been reflected
in the sub-groups' performances. On September 28, 2002, the CSRC further
promulgated Measures to Administer the Takeover of Listed Companies (the
Takeover Rules) and Rules of Management of Disclosure Requirements for Changes
of Controlling Shareholders of Listed Companies (the "Disclosure Requirements")
with both becoming effective from 1st December 2002. These two regulations are
similar to those from other mature markets and serve as helpful additions to the
Securities Law in regulating takeovers. They are drafted so comprehensively that they
apply to a wide range of possible transactions, such as hostile takeovers, which are
unlikely to be permitted in a foreseeable future. The impact of these two important
regulations on gains around the announcements of acquisitions of control remains a
topic for future research.
Target firm size effects are not apparent in the Chinese M&As or acquisitions of
control according to the empirical findings presented in this chapter. However,
limitations regarding the variable selection and methodological issues have been
noted.
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Another unique variable in the Chinese context is proved to be of no explanatory
power either. It is found that the degree of abnormal returns around the
announcements of acquisitions of control for the target firms is the same regardless of
the existing A share percentages in the targets' share structure. This result is
disappointing initially. However, if the private ownership (A share percentage) does
not have a significant impact on firm performance and its restructuring activities, then
the government ownership (state share percentage and legal-person share percentage)
is perhaps expected to be ofmore explanatory power and this conjecture may confirm
previous research results of Sun et al. (2003).
This chapter extends research regarding the voting-power effects into the Chinese
context and confirms that voting power has a positive impact on the abnormal returns
of target shareholders. Higher gains are associated with higher voting power involved,
when measured by the percentage of the legal-person shares traded. This gives
support to Shleifer and Vishny (1986)'s findings that a company's expected profit is
increased by large shareholders, relative to their percentage of ownership.
Last but not least, previous performance proves to be an important variable and the
empirical results reveal the most interesting findings in this chapter. If targets are
poorly managed and have a bad performing history, their shareholders gain more upon
being taken over. If the targets, on the other hand, are performing well and have a
good/recovering performing history, the restructurings actually destroy value.
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Since there are numerous factors that could potentially affect the gains ofM&As, it is
extremely difficult to separate the effect of each factor and to examine all of these
potentialities. However, the empirical results presented in this chapter provide some
helpful information and allow one to go further in addressing the potential sources




During the writing of the thesis in 2004, China International Trust and Investment
Corporation announced an offer to acquire 51% of Guangfa Securities for US$217
million140. Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, China's largest carmaker, was
reported to be consolidating all its key assets into a new holding company as a prelude
to listing its shares overseas.141 More recently, China Construction Bank raised more
than US$6,000 million via its initial public offer (IPO) in 2006, making it the biggest
IPO in seven years in Asia since 1999.142 These activities would not have been
possible 20 years ago in China when the concepts of "stock", "restructuring" and
"IPO", etc. only existed in the text books about western economies. However, at
present, there are over 1,300 companies listed on the region's two stock exchanges and
corporate restructurings are common, with many involving listed firms as well. Indeed,
the financial markets in China have developed dramatically and this research has
addressed one of its most high profile features - mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In
particular, the study attempted to answer the question as to whether M&A or
acquisition of control created value in China.
The following section 6.1 summarises the thesis and the empirical findings. Section
6.2 critically reviews the findings, by identifying possible limitations in this research
and suggests some future research. Final thoughts are presented in section 6.3
140 China Daily. 29 September 2004.
141
Program from BBC News 24, viewed in November, 2004.
142
http://news.vahoo.com. accessed December, 2006.
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6.1 Summary
As the biggest developing country in the world, China has maintained an average of
7.9% annual GDP growth rate 7 years continuously since 1998 according to the
World Bank.143 Its stock markets have expanded radically over the last 15 years.
M&A activities have grown from non-existence to being one of the most influential
drivers of corporate restructurings in Asia. More research has become available
regarding China's stock markets, however, relatively less is known regarding its M&A
activities.
This thesis comprehensively introduced the M&A activities in China and related
issues, namely, the SOE reform schemes and the stock markets. It reviewed how
M&As in China have developed to become what they are today. In particular, it
documented the major changes in the relevant legislation over the last 20 years or so,
covering from the Bankruptcy Law promulgated in 1986 to some of the latest
regulations and therefore contributed to knowledge by providing a full picture of the
evolving nature of Chinese regulations governing M&As. Overall the legal framework
has been constantly modified to be more comprehensive.
However, the regulations have been issued piecemeal. A vast volume of regulations
has been issued over the last 20 years, from various governing bodies ranging from
the State Council, the Ministry of Finance, the People's Bank of China, and the China
Securities Regulatory Commission to municipal governments. This easily leads to
overlaps and causes confusion. In addition, as shown in Chapter 2, it is very common
143
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrvdala/countrvdata.html. accessed May, 2005.
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in China for new regulations to be labelled "provisional" or "interim". This seems to
indicate that they are to be revised, yet many of these "provisional" or "interim"
regulations remain effective for years with few changes. Moreover, regulations in
China can appear in the form of a "circular," a "notice," or similar and this adds to the
possible confusion. Last but not least, some of the most important regulations have
only become effective in 2002144. The legislators appear to have lagged behind the
development of the restructuring activity. In short, before China promulgates a single
M&A law, the regulations will remain quite a maze.
This study empirically tests the joint hypothesis that 1) the domestic Chinese A share
markets are efficient in terms of quickly and fully anticipating new information and 2)
target firms in China gain through acquisitions of control. It is found: 1) that the
Chinese stock markets' reaction towards announcements of acquisitions of control are
not inconsistent with market efficiency. What is more, the markets seems to be
informationally efficient, that investors correctly anticipate the forthcoming
announcement of an acquisition and 2) that, on average, value is created by the
transactions for the target firms - target shareholders gain from such restructurings.
These findings are encouraging and are new contributions to knowledge.
By further dividing the data sample into seven pairs of sub-groups according to seven
different explanatory variables, the following was found.
144
For example, Regulations on the Takeover of Listed Companies (_k rhb] Mti) and
Measures for the Administration ofDisclosure of Shareholder Equity Changes of Listed Companies (_h
issued by the CSRC in September 2002.
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1) The mean abnormal returns from the two stock markets, the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, appear to be no different. This agrees with
the theoretical arguments that a matching pattern in terms of share price adjustment
should be expected when the two stock exchanges are designed to, and are, serving
the same function.
2) The mean abnormal returns gained by investors in the industrial group of
companies differ from those gained by investors in non-industrial companies for
period day-60 to day-1. The market appears to view a takeover of non-industrial
targets as more "value-adding" than when industrial firms are targeted.
3) When the sample is divided according to the criterion as whether the announcement
occurred before the Securities Law became effective or after, it is concluded that the
post-law markets seem to be able to anticipate the forthcoming event more promptly
and perhaps more correctly than before the Securities Law became effective. This
finding is consistent with that of Li et al. (2000) who conclude that the Chinese stock
market's efficiency improves from 1994 to 1999.
4) When the sample is divided according to their sizes or its percentage of existing A
shares, the degree of average abnormal returns received by sub-groups do not appear
to be different. It is concluded that these two variables are of no explanatory power in
assessing Chinese M&As or acquisitions of control.
5) When the sample is divided according to the percentage of legal-person shares (out
of total outstanding shares of a target) involved in a transaction, it is found that the
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market may favour the acquisitions that see higher voting power transferred compared
to acquisitions where buyers obtain less voting power. The result gives support to
Shleifer and Vishny (1986)'s finding that a company's expected profit is increased by
large shareholders, relative to their percentage of ownership.
6) Acquisitions of control in China create value only when poorly performing targets
are acquired. If well-performing targets are acquired, value is demolished by
restructurings. This finding supports the hubris hypothesis and inefficient
management hypothesis. Moreover, the finding may indicate that the government's
intervention is harming minority shareholders.
6.2 Limitations and Future Research
The findings presented above, however, need to be treated with caution. After all,
M&As in China are fairly different from those of other economies especially when
considering that the targets are listed in a socialist stock market that is unique in the
world. The possible limitations of the research, and indeed, how they might be
improved by future studies, should therefore be fully noted. A few possible limitations
have been analysed across the thesis and they are reviewed here.
6.2.1 Event Definition
There are different forms of M&As in China as detailed in Chapter 2. This study
examined the market responses to the announcements of legal-person share
transactions. The clear definition of this event has its advantages since it helps to
pinpoint the market reaction to a particular type of news and reduces potential biased
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effects from mixed types of news. However, the data set does not include state share
transactions which was the other major form of transactions for M&As in China over
the period studied. This could lead to speculations that the findings obtained using
legal-person share transactions cannot present the real effects of M&As or
acquisitions of control overall. However, the state share transactions are mostly
"orders" from governmental departments. Some shares were transferred free of charge
and some were transferred at prices that were not disclosed. This indicates that the
information content contained in the announcements of state share transactions, if
they are announced at all, may be different compared to that contained in legal-person
share transactions' announcements. Nonetheless, exclusion of state share transactions
may limit the explanatory power of the empirical findings presented in this study.
6.2.2 Data Availability
While almost all studies from the West seem to indicate that target shareholders gain
through restructurings, the wealth gain for the acquiring company's shareholders is not
so clear. This research was not able to address this issue due to limited data
availability. Out of the 160 transactions for which data has been collected, only one
buyer is listed. Therefore it would not be possible to examine the wealth gain to the
acquirer's shareholders. Recent western literature also focused more on the long-term
effects of M&As. However the study presented in this thesis could only examine
short-term gains (with a 121-day event period being the longest window). This is
because when the data was collected in late 2001, there were not enough data to carry
out long-term wealth creation tests. Overall, these two data-related issues could be
addressed by future research when more data becomes available.
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6.2.3 Variable and the Choice of Proxy
Chapter 5 explored seven explanatory variables to examine their impacts on
acquisitions of control. Some variable appear to be of more explanatory power than
others. The size effect, for instance, when measured by the absolute value of the target,
does not appear to exist in China. As analysed, this may be due to the proxy used.
Western studies conventionally examine the size effect measured by the target size
relative to the buyer size, whereas in Chapter 5, total value of assets of a target was
chosen to be the proxy as the size variable. This choice of proxy may not be entirely
correct. This limitation has been fully noted and it remains of future research interest.
6.2.4 Personal Perception
The background review in Chapter 2 presented one of the most comprehensive
analytical descriptions of the development of China's corporate restructurings and its
legislation improvement. However, due to the complexity of the subject itself, it
would be too bold to claim that the every single related issue was covered. Indeed,
one's personal knowledge and perception could influence the depth and the fairness of
these descriptions and analysis.
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6.3 Final Thoughts
The gains ofM&As are affected by many variables. These variables are either directly
or indirectly related to some extent - after all, they are all connected with the same
underlying assets. It is therefore impossible to completely separate each factor and to
identify what the individual influence is. However, this research provides useful
information and enables one to go further in addressing the potentialities.
The competitive environment is ever changing. In May 2004, the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange launched a "small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) board" ('T'
145, a de facto embedded subordinate of the main board of SZSE. The board was
designed to list the growing SMEs with outstanding main businesses and innovative
high-tech start-ups. It was run semi-independently, with its own index, trade code and
supervisory system. Companies that seek listings on the new board will have to meet
the same requirements demanded by the main Shenzhen market. For example,
entrants are required to show a three-year profit record and IPOs are subject to further
approval, as detailed in Chapter 2. It has long been speculated that the main board of
SZSE will eventually be merged with the main market in SHSE. Clearly, the setup of
a SME board paves the way for a completely independent NASDAQ-style market in
the future.
More recently in September 2005, the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) published a revised list of 169 large SOEs146
145 Initially known as "Second Board" (Jfj—¥&), also known as "Growing Enterprise Market" (li'l^iiS)
(GEM)
146 This was previously 49 in December 2003, later increased to 196, but reduced to 169 in September
2005.
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and announced that the central government will focus on managing only these so
called "central SOEs" The SASAC then confirmed that all the remaining
SOEs would remain the responsibility of local governments to either close, restructure
or sell off.147 This latest decision is widely anticipated as the central government's
determination to speed up privatisation and it will undoubtedly trigger a new wave of
M&As in China.
147 http://news.xvfund.eom/092005/26/317091.html. accessed September 2005.
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